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ABSTRACT 
Innovations in government produce positive externalities for other 
jurisdictions.  Theory therefore predicts that local government will tend to 
produce a lower than optimal amount of innovation, as officials will prefer to 
free ride on innovation by others.  As Susan Rose-Ackerman observed in 1980, 
these predictions, if true, tend to undermine arguments by proponents of 
federated government that decentralization will lead to many competing 
“laboratories of democracy.”  In this Article, we review and critically assess 
nearly three decades of responses to Rose-Ackerman’s arguments, none of 
which have been discussed in depth in the legal literature.  In addition, we 
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sketch and evaluate other possible grounds for believing that local officials 
may have incentives to innovate in the face of the temptation of free-riding. 
We conclude that there are no demonstrably overwhelming replies to Rose-
Ackerman’s skepticism, and analyze the policy implications that follow.  For 
instance, we suggest that one implication may be that certain regulatory 
regimes, such as corporate governance regulation, might best be centered at 
the national level, where collective action problems affecting public officials 
are lessened.  However, we also caution that this result would depend on the 
likely effectiveness of industry itself propagating “good” regulation, or the 
effectiveness of contracting regulatory functions out to intermediaries, such as 
private consulting firms or nonprofit organizations, who might use property 
rights to more fully capture the gains of policy innovation.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The American vision of federalism likens decentralized government to a 
host of civic Marie Curies, each tirelessly in pursuit of discoveries to better 
mankind.  Justice Louis Brandeis famously praised state and local governments 
as the “laboratories” of democracy.1  Justice Anthony Kennedy writes that the 
invention of federalism “split the atom of sovereignty.”2  The very Founders 
Kennedy hails, though, recognized that even scientists need incentives to 
innovate; knowing even then the familiar economic point that there is often 
little invention without property rights, the Founders provided authority for 
federal patent protection in the Constitution.3  State and local governments can 
be thought of as inventors without patents: because anyone can steal their new 
ideas, what incentive have they ever had to invent?  In this Article, the first of 
a two-part series, we begin to draw out in detail the consequences of this 
dilemma for federalism, and the question of centralized versus decentralized 
government more generally. 
There are, of course, other factors that weigh in favor of decentralized 
government, but all of them are controversial or limited in scope.  For 
example, according to the spatial competition model first suggested by Charles 
Tiebout, policy is developed simultaneously in many parallel jurisdictions, and 
citizens can choose which unit delivers services most efficaciously, leading to 
more efficient government.4  Yet it is unclear whether this efficiency gain is 
outweighed by the costs involved in the constant uprooting and relocation that 
would accompany competition, not to mention the sacrifice of potential 
economies of scale from locating services in one large, central unit.5  Similarly, 
 
 
1
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 
2
 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
3
 Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248 (1994).  
For modern discussions of the economics of incentives to invent, see id. at 247–71; Richard J. Gilbert, 
Competition and Innovation, J. INDUS. ORG. EDUC., Oct 2006, at 1, 12, http://www.bepress.com/jioe/vol1/ 
iss1/8. 
 
4
 PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17–18, 25–26 (1995); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83–85 (Dennis C. 
Mueller ed., 1997); Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 93, 
95–97 (1981); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1151, 1161–62 (2000).  The theory originates with Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), and there is a voluminous literature criticizing, defending, and 
applying it. 
 
5
 See generally Robert P. Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 
45–46 (1997); Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 35, 35 (1973); 
Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and 
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while decentralizing government might allow citizens to sort themselves 
according to their preferences for the kind and amount of government 
services,6 this divided government also leads to inefficiencies, as local 
governments may not internalize the positive or negative spillovers generated 
by their choices.7  Government that is smaller, divided, and closer to the 
population is said to enhance democracy and better protect rights,8 but multiple 
tiers of government also reduce transparency and make it harder to hold 
officials at all levels to account for their decisions.9 
In contrast, the opportunity for greater experimentation in decentralized 
government has generally been presented in the legal literature as an unalloyed 
point in favor of federalism.10  For courts, too, a key argument in favor of 
decentralized provision of government services, such as in the U.S. system of 
 
Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1408 (2004).  For surveys of the tradeoff between mobility and 
the deadweight losses of mobility, see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and European Union: 
Contrasting Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133, 133–42 (2001) (addressing the results of 
inter-jurisdictional competition and other competing programs); John Douglas Wilson & David E. Wildasin, 
Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1065, 1065, 1067–88 (2004) (detailing the effect of 
tax competition). 
 
6
 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating 
the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–99 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: 
THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)); Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1120, 1122–23 (1999). 
 
7
 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 405–09 (1997); Oates, supra note 6, at 
1121; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation 
of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977).  Spillovers, and their close cousins, 
externalities, both describe benefits or burdens that affect a party other than the immediate actor, and whose 
consequences would not be taken into account by an actor motivated strictly by self-servingly maximizing the 
actor’s own well-being.  JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 120–27 (2d ed. 2007). 
 
8
 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457–59; Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 21 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1768 
(2006); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative 
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 25 (2007); Mariano Tommasi & Frederico Weinschelbaum, Centralization 
vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent Analysis, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 369, 378, 380 (2007); Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L REV. 1, 63 (2004). 
 
9
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The 
New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 110. 
 
10
 E.g., PETERSON, supra note 4, at 18–19; ALICE RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE 
ECONOMY, THE STATES, & THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 10, 126 (1992); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A 
DIALOGUE 85–88 (1995); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional 
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 208–09 (1997); Larry 
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994); McConnell, supra note 6, at 1498–
1500. 
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federalism, is that an array of local governments is more innovative than a 
single monolithic central authority.11 
These claims persist despite what would seem a devastating critique, first 
raised by Susan Rose-Ackerman in 1980.12  Professor Rose-Ackerman 
(hereinafter RA) pointed out not one but two serious flaws in the claim that 
local governments can be relied upon as engines of invention.  First, as we 
noted at the outset, in the absence of property rights local innovation belongs 
to the world.13  If innovation is at all costly, this suggests that each jurisdiction 
may (absent some countervailing factor) prefer to free ride on the experimental 
efforts of others—that is, to wait for someone else to invent a new government 
policy or method, and simply copy it.  Unless some other government 
intervenes to resolve this collective action dilemma, the incentive of every 
jurisdiction is to wait.  Second, even if a jurisdiction as a whole is well-served 
by experimentation, its public officials might not be.  Incumbents, safe in their 
offices, have little reason to engage in risky new policies for which they might 
be punished if things go wrong.14 
With one or two exceptions, the American legal academy has minimized 
RA’s arguments.  As we noted, any number of scholars of federalism routinely 
argue that experimentation is a reason to favor decentralized government, 
generally acknowledging RA with a “but see” footnote and at most a few 
sentences of explanation.15  A notable departure is the work of the corporate 
 
 
11
 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). 
 
12
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980). 
 
13
 Id. at 604. 
 
14
 Id. at 605. 
 
15
 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 9, at 78, 79 & n.34; Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60, 61 & n.322 (1998); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Power: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2214 
n.157 (1988); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce 
Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 561, 562 & n.26 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause 
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–10 n.47 (1988); McConnell, 
supra note 6, at 1498 n.58; Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of 
Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 157 n.32 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation 
in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1573, 1574 & n.132 (1983).  
Several other scholars have expressed their agreement with the Rose-Ackerman thesis, but again these 
discussions have been mere passing mentions or a few sentences in a footnote.  Richard Briffault, “What About 
the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1326 
n.80 (1994); Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the 
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 579 n.114 (1999); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From 
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 412 n.176; 
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scholar Larry Ribstein, who has accepted RA’s claims but offered a detailed 
analysis of at least one tool, lawyer licensing, with which the dynamic RA 
sketches might be overcome.16  Ian Ayres has also applied RA’s arguments to 
the debate over state regulation of corporate governance.17  While these are 
both important contributions, the significance of the RA thesis is much 
broader. 
In contrast, academics from other disciplines have spilled much ink 
debating the accuracy and implications of her thesis.  In particular, there is a 
long tradition in both political science and economics that attempts to explain 
how policy diffuses from one jurisdiction to another.18  Because RA’s 
argument depends in part on how easily innovations may be transferred from 
one government to another, that scholarship has an obvious bearing on her 
conclusions.  There have also been other, more direct efforts to analyze or 
measure aspects of RA’s hypothesis, generally by economists.19  As far as we 
 
Joshua Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 205, 215 n.53 (1997).  Rubin and Feeley, in their classic assault on federalism, briefly employ RA’s 
arguments, but as we will show their discussion omits a great deal of nuance.  Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm 
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 924–26, 925 n.79 (1994).  
The most comprehensive negative discussion is by Barry Friedman, who devotes several paragraphs to RA’s 
argument, most of which simply recite a handful of policies invented by states.  Friedman, supra note 7, at 
397–400.  We discuss Friedman’s substantive arguments in depth infra text accompanying notes 69–70 and 
infra note 303. 
 
16
 Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 327–
62 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 EMORY L.J. 
1, 60–62 (2002). 
 
17
 Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents, 
Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 545 (1995). 
 
18
 For reviews, see Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy 
Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 399–400 (1990); David P. Dolowitz & 
David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13 
GOVERNANCE 5, 6–21 (2000); Oliver James & Martin Lodge, The Limitations of ‘Policy Transfer’ and ‘Lesson 
Drawing’ for Public Policy Research, 1 POL. STUD. REV. 179 (2003); Christoph Knill, Introduction: Cross-
National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 764, 
764–72 (2005); David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International System as an 
Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 53–60 (2005); Barbara Wejnert, 
Integrating Models of Diffusion of Innovations: A Conceptual Framework, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 297, 297–320 
(2002). 
 
19
 Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 
MCGILL L.J. 130, 149 (1991); Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, On the Incentives to Experiment in 
Federations, 60 J. URB. ECON. 484, 485 (2006); Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization 
Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 209 (2002); Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, 
Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation 3–4 (Lab. for Macroeconomic Analysis, Working Paper 
No. WP13_2007_05, 2007), http://www.cas.hse.ru/Repec/pdf/WP13_2007_05.pdf; Amihai Glazer & Hiroki 
Kondo, Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions 4 (Univ. of Cal.-Irvine Dept. of Econ., Working Paper 
No. 070807, 2007), http://www.economics.uci.edu/docs/2007-08/glazer-07.pdf. 
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are aware, however, there has never been any comprehensive effort to bring 
together all the disparate bits and pieces of evidence and analysis. 
Accordingly, our aim in this Article is to synthesize RA’s arguments with 
all that has come after her, and to offer a global assessment about the true 
extent of innovation among decentralized governments.  At each step we 
attempt not only to summarize the work of others but also to subject it to 
careful scrutiny.  At many points we supplement gaps in the literature with our 
own conjecture.  We hope this synthesis will be of interest to lawyers, 
economists, and political scientists alike.  In addition, we note a number of 
points on which the available empirical data are thin, and suggest new research 
aimed at those uncertainties. 
Our central conclusion is that, while much remains unknown, there is at 
least a large grain of truth to RA’s assessment.  State and local governments do 
innovate.  But they are unlikely to innovate in all instances at the optimal 
social level, or in a way that captures the true benefits of experimentation.  
Accordingly, there is a case for federal intervention, either to correct some of 
the dysfunction of the market for state government, or to displace it with a top-
down federal model.  In a follow-up article, we will examine potential 
shortcomings in the top-down models, as well as the viability of cooperative 
efforts between local and national governments in which the key role of the 
national government is to provide local governments with the correct set of 
incentives. 
The path to this end result is long.  One secondary point we hope to make, 
even to those who would reject our ultimate conclusions, is that the question 
whether innovation adds to the allure of decentralized government is a highly 
nuanced one, not to be resolved in a footnote or an aside.  For instance, we 
show that in order to assess the likelihood that states will free ride on the 
innovation of others, one first must answer a host of other questions, such as 
what kinds of information about the innovation are valuable to other 
jurisdictions, whether other jurisdictions are similar enough to make use of that 
information, who has access to the relevant information, and what the 
incentives of those individuals are for sharing it with outsiders.  Even if there is 
a free-rider dynamic at play, it might be overcome by potential benefits from 
being a first mover.  There would be many subsidiary factors that go into that 
problem, such as whether jurisdictions are competing for outside capital, 
whether that capital is mobile and rationally allocated, whether there are risks 
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attached to the innovation, and whether the jurisdiction’s residents are averse 
to risks of the magnitude offered by the potential new policy or method. 
The possibility of agency costs adds an additional layer of complication to 
our analysis.  As RA points out, even if the inhabitants of a local jurisdiction 
are not risk averse, their public officials may be.20  Again, then, we must be 
closely attuned to the likely incentives of officials.  Critics of RA have argued 
that she underestimates the significance of officials’ desire to win higher 
office, which might motivate them to innovate beyond the preferences of their 
constituents.21  As we will show, these critics miss much important detail—for 
instance, whether voters in fact reward innovation per se or, if so, whether it is 
easy to mimic innovation, either of which could greatly reduce the incentive to 
take on the additional risks and costs of innovating.  And unelected bureaucrats 
likely lack any high-powered incentive to risk losing their jobs.  Yet other 
factors in play include possible psychological biases in favor of maintaining 
the status quo and avoiding uncertainty, agenda-setting by rivals for office, and 
pressure from political parties.  Most of these factors, we argue, tend to make 
true experiments less likely. 
Finally, we note by way of preview of our follow-up work that the 
literature has largely overlooked the possibility that local jurisdictions can 
overcome the absence of property rights by contracting out government 
services to private firms or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  Firms 
and NGOs also may offer a solution for other problems, such as the fact that it 
may be difficult for citizens to relocate to a jurisdiction that matches both their 
ideological and risk-seeking preferences.  However, in many cases these 
solutions are something of a pyrrhic victory.  Because the firm retains property 
rights in its innovation, only the firm, and those to whom it licenses its rights, 
can take advantage of the innovation.  Firms with property rights typically 
exact monopoly rents for their protected property, so the amount of innovation 
that the firm provides to the nation as a whole will again be below the socially 
optimal amount. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I introduces 
RA’s arguments, noting that later commentators have sometimes overlooked 
the fact that she raises two analytically distinct points.  Part II undertakes a 
detailed assessment of the likelihood of free-rider effects, assuming no agency 
 
 
20
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 603, 605. 
 
21
 Hills, supra note 8, at 23, 24 & n.76; Kotsogiannis & Schwager, supra note 19, at 486; Strumpf, supra 
note 19, at 227–28; see also Lazer, supra note 18, at 61 (noting this argument in passing). 
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costs.  Part III relaxes the assumption of perfect agency, examining the 
incentives of local officials to innovate or not.  The last segment is our 
conclusion. 
I. SPILLOVERS AND THE ROSE-ACKERMAN THESIS 
In this Part, we lay out the argument advanced by Susan Rose-Ackerman in 
her seminal article on federalism and policy innovation.  RA’s thesis, in a 
nutshell, is that states may not be “laboratories” of democracy, as Brandeis 
pithily suggested, because state-level politicians (although perhaps ambitious 
for higher office) will act in a risk-averse manner, and therefore, will promote 
little innovation.22 
Importantly, RA identifies two analytically separate effects which 
contribute to her conclusion (each of which we address in turn): 
(1) information about innovative policies diffuses to other jurisdictions, where 
policymakers will free ride on the innovations of the first-mover jurisdictions; 
and (2) policymakers are not perfect agents of the voters, and instead of 
focusing on maximizing the welfare of the electorate, they focus on 
maximizing their own welfare by winning reelection. 
RA begins by assuming that any government is run by a single, risk-neutral 
policymaker who is concerned solely with being reelected—and who must take 
some risks in order to win reelection.23  In any event, the policymaker faces 
uncertainty regarding whether the projects will succeed and the extent to which 
the public will support her based on her successes.24 
 
 
22
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 594.  RA does not define the term “innovation,” but we take her to 
mean—and, when we use the term, we mean—any policy innovation, whether large or small.  As a result, 
when we write of one jurisdiction “copying” another jurisdiction’s policy innovation, we mean copying it 
exactly, without any modification.  As we see it, when one jurisdiction copies another jurisdiction’s policy 
innovation, but also modifies the prior innovation (whether to improve on it or customize it or whatever), the 
modification (no matter how small) is itself a policy innovation.  As a result, all of the same incentives to 
innovate or copy that we discuss herein also apply to the modification of policy innovations—although 
perhaps to a lesser degree, because modifying an innovation is presumably less costly than wholesale 
innovation.  That is to say, to the extent that modifying is less expensive than wholesale innovation (but more 
expensive than slavish copying), the incentive to free ride is reduced and the incentive to “innovate” is 
increased. 
 
23
 See id. at 596.  RA’s model also assumes elections occurring at preordained times some years apart, 
constant voter turnout levels, a single opponent for the incumbent in the upcoming election, and a requirement 
that the winner of the election receive greater than 50% of the vote.  See id.  Obviously, one could easily 
question whether any or all of these assumptions are realistic. 
 
24
 See id. at 597; see also Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880, 890 (1969).  RA’s model also assumes, inter alia, that the policymaker cannot 
GALLE&LEAHY GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:18:03 PM 
1342 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58 
RA first discusses a unitary government and then a system of multiple, 
competing local governments (i.e., as if they were states without any federal 
system).  With respect to the unitary-government policymaker, RA concludes 
that though she is risk neutral, the model’s operation will cause the 
policymaker to act as though she is risk averse.25  In brief, the idea is that 
innovations have a risk of failure, which will hurt the incumbent’s chances of 
reelection.  Safe incumbents have relatively little reason to take that chance.  
Hence, in a unitary government where projects end prior to the next election, 
an incumbent who faces a tight race for reelection “may have a greater 
incentive to carry out risky projects” than an incumbent who expects to win the 
next election handily.26  Thus, government officials will be reluctant to embark 
on unproven policy, even when there are no other states from whom to borrow. 
RA then turns to a multi-jurisdictional system.27  Focusing on a local public 
good (i.e., one that, when produced in one state, has no spillover effects into 
any other state) that is valued in all states (i.e., so that innovative new ways of 
producing the good are valued in all states), RA posits a world in which there 
is no cost for policymakers to import innovations from other states.28  RA also 
assumes that voters (presumably knowing that innovation can easily be 
imported from other states) reward an incumbent only if she does well 
compared to other jurisdictions—and penalize an incumbent “for wasting 
money on innovation” if she is not successful as compared to other 
jurisdictions.29  That is, in addition to being risky, innovation is also costly.30 
In the multi-jurisdictional model, officials are considerably more averse to 
risky innovation than in the single-government model.31  Officials in multiple-
jurisdiction systems have two powerful reasons for eschewing innovation.  
Crucial to both is the assumption that each state can easily copy its own 
 
compensate voters by other means after having made risky choices that do not result in a public benefit and 
that the policymaker chooses from a range of preexisting projects rather than designing them herself.  See 
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 597. 
 
25
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 601.  For general discussions of risk aversion, see George A. 
Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 719, 721 (1988); Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral 
Competition, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555, 560–61 (1972). 
 
26
 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 603. 
 
27
 Id. 
 
28
 See id. at 604. 
 
29
 See id. 
 
30
 Ayres, supra note 17, at 546; Berry & Berry, supra note 18, at 400. 
 
31
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 605–14. 
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policies from others.32  Thus, each official knows she can get good policy 
results without incurring any risk herself.33  Further, the general public wishes 
to avoid both the risks and costs of innovation if they can get identical results 
at lower risk and cost by copying.  They will be angry with an official who 
unnecessarily innovates, rather than free-riding on the efforts of others.  As a 
result, “The better other governments are expected to do, the less incentive any 
politician has to initiate projects [in the search for innovation].”34 
Thus, RA concludes that “a secure incumbent may value [such innovation] 
less highly than the citizenry and so be unwilling to take chances that most 
people would support.”35  Put another way, RA’s model implies that where 
there are benefits to other states from innovation, the total amount of 
innovation will fall below the socially optimal level.36  A central planner, who 
could not free ride on others’ efforts, and who internalized the benefits to all of 
society from new policies, would innovate to a degree much closer to the level 
that would maximize social welfare.37  This consequence of positive spillovers 
is a familiar point in the vast literature on innovation among industrial 
organizations.38 
Innovation is also slowed by the option value of delay.39  Second movers 
can wait to observe whether an innovation has value, and then exercise the 
option to copy.  Moving first entails sacrificing the economic value of this 
option.40  As Sarah Brooks points out, this effect will tend to be smaller as the 
initial costs of innovating diminish, because in that case there is little value in 
avoiding the costs of moving first.41 
Subsequent economic literature has further developed the contours of the 
losses to society when local jurisdictions can free ride on one another.  The 
 
 
32
 Id. at 604, 610. 
 
33
 Id. at 604–05, 610. 
 
34
 Id. at 605. 
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 Id.  This is the formulation emphasized by other economists.  E.g., Oates, supra note 6, at 1133. 
 
37
 See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 148–49 
(2003); Oates, supra note 6, at 1133. 
 
38
 René Belderbos et al., Cooperative R&D and Firm Performance, 33 RES. POL’Y 1477, 1479 (2004); 
Dam, supra note 3, at 248–51; see ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 46 (1988). 
 
39
 Sarah M. Brooks, When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms 
Across Nations, 69 J. POL. 701, 705 (2007); Lars P. Feld et al., Federalism, Decentralization, and Economic 
Growth, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE: CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOR OF CHARLES B. BLANKART 
103, 110 (Pio Baake & Rainald Borck eds., 2007). 
 
40
 Brooks, supra note 39, at 704–05; see Wejnert, supra note 18, at 304. 
 
41
 Brooks, supra note 39, at 705–06. 
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basic notion, again, is that there is a positive spillover from attempting to enact 
new policies.  Because each jurisdiction realizes only a fraction of the total 
gains that society as a whole could reap from a given new policy, each 
individual jurisdiction underinvests in efforts to develop that policy.42  In 
addition, failures and alternatives also produce informational spillovers.43  If 
State A has tried policy X and failed, State B now knows that it need not try 
too.44  However, the process of attempting to implement X may produce 
valuable information that could lead to several different new possibilities.45  
The same is true of B’s efforts with a parallel policy, Y.  If State A never 
attempts X, or if B never attempts Y, both lose.  But, because neither realizes 
any benefit from the gains this information can produce elsewhere, neither will 
have incentives to produce it at the level that would maximize social welfare.  
Thus, the free-rider problem is not just a lack of innovation; it is also a lack of 
experimentation—of different jurisdictions all trying, and sometimes failing, 
along different routes, and learning from one another’s efforts.46 
An example may be helpful here.  Suppose that policy theorists have 
recently developed a strategy for enhancing social welfare by regulating the 
color of widgets.  Also suppose that, for each state that mandates that all 
widgets be red, there is a 50% chance of either increasing or decreasing total 
state welfare by the equivalent of $1 billion.  Alternatively, states could 
mandate that all widgets be green, but policy analysts predict this will have a 
60% chance of losing $1 billion and only a 40% chance of gaining $1 billion.  
If widget-color policy is chosen at the state level, no state will regulate the 
 
 
42
 Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 149–50; Cai & Treisman, supra note 19, at 3. 
 
43
 Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 150–51; Wolfgang Kerber & Martina Eckardt, Policy Learning in 
Europe: The Open Method of Co-Ordination and Laboratory Federalism, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 227, 229 
(2007); Strumpf, supra note 19, at 208. 
  Information that benefits other jurisdictions is not purely an externality for most individuals.  For 
instance, improving policy elsewhere is appealing if we might consider moving there, see Cai & Treisman, 
supra note 19, at 21, or if we wish to threaten our local officials with the credible possibility that we will do so, 
see Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax 
Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 679, 682, 700 (2007).  Similarly, for diversified investors, policy that benefits firms in 
other jurisdictions likely increases the value of the investor’s overall portfolio.  Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 
149–50.  But all of these effects only diminish the size of externality; they do not eliminate it. 
 
44
 See Strumpf, supra note 19, at 226; Cai & Treisman, supra note 19, at 17. 
 
45
 See Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 150–51; Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Towards a 
Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition Laws, 1 J. COMPETITION L. 411, 420 (2003); Ken 
Kollman et al., Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 115 (2000). 
 
46
 See Cai & Treisman, supra note 19, at 18–19; Lazer, supra note 18, at 61; Strumpf, supra note 19, at 
226; cf. Craig Volden et al., A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 319, 
327–28 (stating that states can free ride not only on first movers but also intermediate actors). 
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color of widgets.47  Assuming implementation will cost more than zero, there 
is no expected value to any state in regulating. 
But what if widget policy is set nationally?  The federal government may 
launch a pilot project, under which red-widget law is rolled out in a single 
state.  If the policy fails, the nation loses $1 billion.  But if it succeeds, red-
widget mandates can be implemented nationwide, at a gain of $50 billion.  
That is a fifty-to-one bet at 50% odds—a no-brainer that, under decentralized 
experimentation, no state will undertake.  Plus, the federal experimenter can 
diversify its risk by also implementing the green-widget mandate in a single 
state.  Again, a fifty-to-one bet with a 40% chance of payoff is a great wager, 
and it is possible green will succeed where red fails.  Yet, even if states were 
willing to try widget regulation, it is likely none would consider trying green 
mandates, because green is obviously only the second-best strategy. 
RA concludes her article by asking briefly whether things might be 
different for states within a federal system—states supervised by a federal 
government.48  She touches on several reasons why cooperative federalism 
may be better—or somewhat better.  First, she points out that state officials can 
run for federal—i.e., higher—office, thereby lessening their conservative 
bent.49  What’s more, the simple fact that federal offices exist might make the 
lower offices more attractive (as stepping stones), giving rise to more 
challengers.50  Third, RA posits that a politician in state office may, due to the 
existence of a federal system, have more incentive to develop projects that are 
useful outside of the jurisdiction.51  Or, fourth, she suggests that federal 
policymakers might engage in an innovation policy to reward state-level 
policymakers who develop innovations.52 
We will reserve comparisons between centralized innovation and 
decentralized, state-level innovation for the second installment in this series.  
In this Article, our focus instead is on the assumptions that drive RA’s results.  
For example, what if information in fact is not costless to acquire?  And is it 
correct that desire for higher office or other incentives might lead officials to 
be more, rather than less, interested in innovation than their constituents? 
 
 
47
 See Gilbert, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that if inventor of a copyable good cannot sell or license the 
right to produce, it will only innovate when there is positive expected value irrespective of copying). 
 
48
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 614–16. 
 
49
 See id. 
 
50
 See id. 
 
51
 See id. at 615. 
 
52
 See id. 
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II. INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES 
In this Part, we begin our assessment of RA’s analysis by examining her 
claim that local governments will prefer to free ride on the innovation of 
others.  In our view this argument decomposes into three subparts.  First, of 
course, there is the question whether it is true that localities may easily copy 
the new policies and methods of others.  Second, even if it is true that copying 
is feasible, we must ask whether jurisdictions might prefer to innovate in order 
to capture first-mover advantages.  Finally, even if there are incentives to move 
first, it is unclear whether these incentives translate into true 
experimentation—that is, whether they produce innovation, or only a race to be 
first to snatch the lowest hanging policy fruits.  Throughout this Part, we 
assume perfect agency between voters and their representatives.  That is, we 
presume that public officials, whether elected or appointed, will act to 
maximize the interests of their constituents, rather than themselves.  We then 
relax that assumption in the next Part. 
A. Opportunities for Free-Riding 
As we have mentioned, the central assumption of RA’s free-rider 
prediction is that it is relatively easy for one jurisdiction to copy and adopt the 
innovations of another.53  If it is very costly to implement domestically 
someone else’s experiment, if it is hard to acquire information about that 
experiment, or if it is dubious whether the experiment is relevant to anyone 
else, then the incentives for free-riding are obviously much lessened.  
Relatedly, the degree to which jurisdictions underproduce innovation, from a 
societal standpoint, is tied to the usefulness of that information elsewhere.  If 
the information generated by an experiment in State A is of low value to other 
states, then there is not much of an externality, and there would 
correspondingly be little reason to adopt policies to encourage states to 
generate more such information.54  Thus, in this section we attempt to appraise 
the accuracy of the assumption that copying is easy.  As we just said, we see 
three key factors that largely dictate whether copying can occur: relevancy, 
information, and costs.  We consider them here in turn, and conclude with a 
brief synthesis. 
 
 
53
 Id. at 604, 610. 
 
54
 See Kollman et al., supra note 45, at 122–23; cf. Lazer, supra note 18, at 61 (observing that when 
jurisdictions have unique policy needs, there is little benefit to sharing information). 
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1. Relevancy 
Some policies cannot easily be transplanted elsewhere.55  Obviously, not all 
innovations are useful in all jurisdictions.  Rules for controlling access to oil 
resources may be of limited use to states that are not oil producers.  Using 
direct-deposit payroll technology as a tool for curtailing government corruption 
is unlikely to succeed in nations without widespread use of computerized 
banking.  For some innovations, at least, it may be predictable that the new 
form of governance would not be relevant elsewhere, and thus will not be 
developed by another jurisdiction.  There then will be little or no opportunities 
to free ride.  These points are intuitive.  What is more difficult is identifying all 
the potential ways in which these sorts of dissimilarities may arise, and 
measuring where they in fact would reduce the size of the externality from 
innovation. 
The literature suggests several ways in which the question of relevance 
may affect innovation.  First, a wide chorus of commentators agrees that states 
must be relatively similar to one another in their institutional structures, 
physical resources, and demographics in order for policy easily to spread from 
one to another.56  Regulations can be tailored to the unique characteristics of a 
region,57 as with our example of direct-deposit payroll.  Such tailored policies 
may offer little benefit to others. 
Second, whatever the overall level of relevance of policy from one 
jurisdiction to another, it is possible that extreme outliers will tend to 
innovate.58  As with the oil extraction example, regions that have some 
especially unique characteristics, and rules specially adapted to them, cannot 
likely expect to free ride.  Jurisdictions can be outliers in more abstract ways, 
as well.  Scholars who study industrial organizations have long noted that for a 
firm successfully to absorb technological innovations by others, it must have a 
 
 
55
 Dolowitz & Marsh, supra note 18, at 17; Kerber & Eckardt, supra note 43, at 234; Wejnert, supra note 
18, at 310. 
 
56
 See Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 295 (2006); Sharun W. Mukand & Dani Rodrik, In Search of the 
Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance 34 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Res. 
Discussion Paper No. 3525, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=336800. 
 
57
 See James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 475, 481 (1996); Mukand & Rodrik, supra note 56, at 3–4; Wejnert, supra note 18, at 310. 
 
58
 See Kollman et al., supra note 45, at 123; Lazer, supra note 18, at 61; Mukand & Rodrik, supra note 
56, at 7. 
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strong knowledge base of its own in the area.59  A firm that is far behind its 
rivals cannot easily copy from them, because the rivals’ achievements are 
beyond its own capacity to absorb.60  The reverse is also true: a firm that is far 
in the lead has a larger incentive to innovate, because it cannot hope to copy 
from lagging rivals.61  These dynamics may describe some international state 
competition, as with our example about electronic payroll.  But it is unlikely 
that there are such dramatic disparities in technology or business methods 
between U.S. states.  We are unaware of any previous efforts to extend this 
point to governments, so this seems a fruitful area for future empirical work.62 
Another area where jurisdictions may be extreme outliers, and also another 
candidate for further study, is in states’ ideological preferences.  The intuition 
here, too, is straightforward: an experiment may be of limited use if the 
originators had clearly different goals than those who might wish to copy it.63  
In theory, some subprocesses or components of a plan with very different 
ideological goals might be usable by others.  But that is unlikely because it is 
probably difficult to evaluate the individual success or failure of a step in the 
policy process apart from its overall results.64  The policy-diffusion literature 
seems to bear these intuitions out, reporting that the most “controversial” 
policies—that is, policies whose goals diverge widely from the average 
preferences of residents of other jurisdictions—spread most slowly.65 
A possible test of the free-rider hypothesis would attempt to turn this result 
upside down.  If it is right that where jurisdictions are highly divergent 
 
 
59
 Morten T. Hansen, The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing Knowledge 
Across Organization Subunits, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 87 (1999); Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and 
the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429, 431 (1994). 
 
60
 See Hansen, supra note 59, at 87; von Hippel, supra note 59, at 431. 
 
61
 See Werner Bönte & Max Keilbach, Concubinage or Marriage? Informal and Formal Cooperations 
for Innovation, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 279, 297 (2005).  But see Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 164, 168–69 
(arguing that, once they capture the lead, leader states may no longer have incentives for further innovation); 
Gilbert, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that technological leaders who already can command large profits from 
existing technology have less incentive to innovate further). 
 
62
 There is, however, a literature on “failed” policy transplants.  E.g., Dolowitz & Marsh, supra note 18, 
at 17–18; Wejnert, supra note 18, at 318 (summarizing other studies). 
 
63
 Kollman et al., supra note 45, at 109, 122; Lazer, supra note 18, at 62. 
 
64
 See EVERT VEDUNG, PUBLIC POLICY AND PROGRAM EVALUATION 209–46 (1997) (discussing tools and 
challenges for evaluating processes independent of the process outcome). 
 
65
 Per-Olof Busch et al., The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Instruments: The Making of a New 
International Environmental Regime, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 146, 164 (2005); Volden, 
supra note 56, at 307, 310.  We note that this is an area where agency costs are likely to be important.  An 
experiment is useful to the extent it provides information about goals that overlap with those of the relevant 
decision maker.  If policymaking officials in a jurisdiction do not perfectly represent the interests of their 
constituency, then the important variable is the ideology of the public official, rather than the public. 
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free-riding is less likely, then we should expect to see that ideological outlier 
states are more innovative than one would otherwise predict for a state of that 
size and wealth.  If small ideological outlier states, such as Utah or Vermont, 
are more innovative across several measures (say, the number of waivers 
requested from uniform federal programs), controlling for size, then that would 
greatly strengthen support for this aspect of RA’s theory. 
An additional way in which states can be outliers is in their available 
resources.  Some innovations can be extremely costly to implement.66  A rich 
jurisdiction surrounded by relatively poor states should be more likely to take 
on such costly innovation, because it cannot plausibly expect its neighbors to 
lead.67  Relatedly, poorer jurisdictions may tend to be more averse to risk, on 
the standard assumption that there is a declining marginal utility of wealth.68  
Thus, the wealthy state may know that its neighbors will be unlikely to take on 
a risky new project. 
Finally, there is one other aspect of similarity between jurisdictions that is 
raised somewhat indirectly by one legal scholar, Barry Friedman.  Professor 
Friedman argues that the incentives of jurisdictions (or their officials) to 
innovate are somewhat beside the point, because officials must innovate in 
response to the problems that inevitably crop up before them.69  This point is 
well-taken only to the extent that different jurisdictions face newly arising 
“problems” that genuinely are unique.  If a jurisdiction faces a new problem, 
but knows that same challenge confronts many others, it likely has the same 
opportunities to free ride as would be present with the more entrepreneurial 
model envisaged by RA.  We see nothing unique about the “problem” model: 
 
 
66
 See Brooks, supra note 39, at 705 (discussing the costs of innovation to initial and subsequent 
innovators). 
 
67
 Cf. id. at 706 (arguing that resource constraints prevent poor states from adopting policies); Wejnert, 
supra note 18, at 302, 305 (noting that low-resource nations could not emulate some policies put in place by 
wealthier countries). 
 
68
 ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 
42, 47 (2007).  On the basic theory of diminishing marginal utility, see GRUBER, supra note 7, at 29–30.  For 
those unfamiliar with the concept, the diminishing marginal utility of money means that earning the one 
millionth dollar is worth much less, in terms of personal welfare, than the thousandth dollar.  If a person 
experienced a loss that left her with less than $1,000, she would starve; if she experienced a loss that left her 
with less than $1,000,000, she would be mildly put out.  This means that she will tend to reject coin flip bets 
with equal money on each side, because the pleasure of the upside gain is worth less to her, in utility terms, 
than the pain of the downside loss.  If she has only a single source of income, her paycheck, then every risk she 
takes in her job is a kind of massive all-or-nothing coin flip. 
 
69
 Friedman, supra note 7, at 397–98; see also Scott P. Hays & Henry R. Glick, The Role of Agenda 
Setting in Policy Innovation: An Event History Analysis of Living-Will Laws, 25 AM. POL. RES. 497, 498 
(1997) (noting this argument). 
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Just as there are costs from delaying a confrontation with the new “problem,” 
there also are opportunity costs from withholding an entrepreneurial 
innovation.  Thus, Professor Friedman’s critique has bite, as we said, only if 
the “problems” he envisions are unlikely soon to be confronted by any other 
jurisdiction.70 
While there have been no direct efforts to quantify these various influences, 
the literature on the patterns of policy “diffusion” may offer some empirical 
data on whether, for any given policy, different jurisdictions are typically alike 
enough to copy from one another.  A key piece of evidence is the pattern of 
diffusion.  Innovations spread most readily to neighboring jurisdictions.71  
Neighbors, of course, are more likely to be alike in many respects, and 
therefore more likely to be alike on the important grounds for any particular 
policy.72  This is a significant point, if true, because it implies that there is a 
fair amount of heterogeneity among jurisdictions—that is, if neighbors can 
adopt faster because they are similar to an innovator, it may follow that those 
who are farther away are different enough that it is harder for them to copy the 
first policy.  Thus, policy that displays a strong pattern of spreading through 
neighbor states may be policy that offers little benefit to far-removed and 
dissimilar jurisdictions. 
The evidence on geographical diffusion is far from conclusive, though.  
The diffusion literature also reports that policy is often spread through informal 
informational networks, such as professional associations, migrants, and the 
like.73  These ties are typically stronger between nations that are 
geographically proximate to one another, and also to those that are culturally 
similar, which again is related to proximity.74  So the two factors, proximity 
 
 
70
 Moreover, if a problem is genuinely unique to a particular jurisdiction, then innovative solutions to the 
problem are unlikely to be useful elsewhere. 
 
71
 Berry & Berry, supra note 18, at 400; Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Disentangling 
Diffusion: The Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy Innovation and 
Expansion, 57 POL. RES. Q. 39, 40 (2004); Note, When Do Policy Innovations Spread? Lessons for Advocates 
of Lesson-Drawing, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1467, 1477 (2006). 
 
72
 Frances Stokes Berry, Sizing Up State Policy Innovation Research, 22 POL’Y STUD. J. 442, 448 (1994); 
William D. Berry & Brady Baybeck, Using Geographic Information Systems to Study Interstate Competition, 
99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 505, 505 (2005). 
 
73
 KARCH, supra note 68, at 106–09, 121–24; Busch et al., supra note 65, at 150; Diane Stone, Transfer 
Agents and Global Networks in the ‘Transnationalization’ of Policy, 11 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 545, 547–50 
(2004). 
 
74
 See Berry & Berry, supra note 18, at 396; Jean-Robert Tyran & Robert Sausgruber, The Diffusion of 
Policy Innovations—An Experimental Investigation, 15 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 423, 424 (2005); Craig 
Volden, Experimenting with Welfare Reform: Emulating Success, Cutting Costs, or Racing to the Bottom?, 87 
SOC. SCI. Q. 791, 796 (2006); Wejnert, supra note 18, at 308, 311–12. 
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and information networks, may be covariant.  As a result, it is hard to say 
whether innovations spread slowly to distant neighbors because they are too 
dissimilar, or because they lack close cultural ties.  In addition, studies have 
found that policy tends to diffuse most effectively to nearby jurisdictions, even 
when controlling for similarities between neighbors.75  So while it is likely that 
there are some policies that are so unique as to forestall free-riding, there is 
little data to suggest that this phenomenon is widespread. 
In sum, based on existing data, there are some policies in certain 
jurisdictions where free-riding incentives will be low.  Leaders will tend to 
continue to lead on the most expensive, knowledge-intensive policies.  
Ideological and geographic outliers will have to go their own way.  In most 
other instances, though, there seems not to be a strong reason to doubt that 
policy can be spread from one place to another. 
2. Information 
Another critical component to the free-riding argument is the assumption 
that jurisdictions can easily obtain information about the experiments of 
others.76  Secrecy can be a substitute for property rights—a state cannot copy 
what it cannot discover.77  Thus, where information is hard to obtain, there is 
little opportunity to free ride, and therefore a greater incentive to innovate.  We 
argue in this section that good information may often prove elusive.  
Innovators rarely have incentives to generate their own information, other 
actors may have limited knowledge about the most useful aspects of an 
experiment, and innovating jurisdictions may actually actively conceal 
information about their activities from outsiders. 
As RA points out, information about an experiment that might prove useful 
to others is typically an externality for the experimenter.78  Therefore, we 
should expect that the experimenter will have no incentive to make that 
information available.79  Furthermore, because other jurisdictions should be 
 
 
75
 Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 849, 
851 (2008); Wejnert, supra note 18, at 319; Note, supra note 71, at 1478. 
 
76
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 611; see also Lazer, supra note 18, at 53, 60 (noting that as access 
to information increases, innovation will decrease). 
 
77
 Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 909–10 (2006) (arguing that 
allowing governments to conceal information will increase the quality of their deliberation, by acting as a 
second-best to protection of property rights). 
 
78
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 610. 
 
79
 Id. at 610–11; see also Rubin & Feeley, supra note 15, at 926. 
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aware of this incentive, they have no reason to trust any information the 
experimenting jurisdiction does produce. 
In theory, other jurisdictions could pay the innovator to share its knowledge 
accurately.80  But here, again, there is a free-rider effect.  If the knowledge is at 
all costly to acquire, and there exist multiple other jurisdictions where it would 
be useful, each should prefer to free ride on the efforts by others to acquire the 
information.81 
As a result, the pertinent question here is whether it is costly to acquire 
information about the experiments of other jurisdictions.  There are a number 
of factors that affect the cost of acquisition.  Costs may vary depending on the 
nature of the information, the technology for sharing it, and the incentives of 
the actors who have access to it. 
a. Nature of Information 
Different forms of information may have different costs, depending on how 
the information is used and conveyed.82  We see three basic possibilities, each 
of which might be true to a greater or lesser extent for a particular kind of 
experiment. 
First, it might be possible that information is very cheap, because the most 
important data is the basic idea of the experiment itself.  In this scenario, just 
 
 
80
 Cf. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 48–49 (noting that standard solution to inter-jurisdictional 
externalities, in absence of transaction costs, is to bargain around them). 
 
81
 Cf. id. at 49 (noting the likelihood of free-riding on efforts of other states in attempts to negotiate for 
collective good).  On the other hand, if purchasing states can enter into some kind of exclusive use agreements 
with the selling states, then opportunities for free-riding here would diminish.  We question, though, whether 
information that is traded from state to state can easily be kept secret, and, knowing that, whether any state 
would pay a premium for the information’s exclusive use. 
  The empirical observation that marginal innovation appears to diminish as the number of jurisdictions 
increases could be a challenge for our theory here.  Kollman et al., supra note 45, at 110.  Our prediction is 
that incentives to innovate would increase with a large number of jurisdictions because higher free riding in 
information collection would make it less likely that any one jurisdiction would invest in learning about others.  
But Kollman’s result may be explained by an opposite and more powerful effect.  If there is an infinite number 
of experiments, each of potentially equal value, we should expect adding new jurisdictions to increase 
experimentation, since we now can attempt more experiments.  However, if some experiments are better than 
others, and this is discernible before the experiment is undertaken, there should be diminishing returns to 
adding new experiments, and therefore to adding new jurisdictions.  Thus, each additional new jurisdiction 
adds slightly less innovation than the one added previously. 
 
82
 See Hays & Glick, supra note 69, at 500 (“Patterns of innovation leadership vary across historical eras, 
and institutional differences between courts and legislatures affect patterns of policy diffusion.”); Lazer, supra 
note 18, at 53–54 (stating that some state policies will be kept private). 
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about any version of the basic idea tends to produce good returns, regardless of 
program details.  For instance, the notion of implementing cap-and-trade 
regimes for certain kinds of environmental pollution turns mostly on the simple 
economic insight that some polluters have lower marginal costs of pollution 
reduction than others.83 
A second alternative is that the processes underlying the experiment are 
what produce the majority of its value.  In this case, other jurisdictions will be 
unable to implement the experiment successfully unless they know how it was 
done at a fairly close level of detail.84  For example, different iterations of 
“community policing” have found greater or lesser success depending on the 
way in which relationships between police and community are structured.85  
Knowledge of processes can be difficult to transmit, because some important 
information may be solely inside the heads of those who carried out the 
processes, and not easily codified.86 
A third set of information that may sometimes be important is outcome 
measurement.  Other governments may be reluctant to attempt a project unless 
they know how it turns out.87  Conveying outcomes is straightforward, but 
measuring them may be costly.88  The originator of a project may also be 
interested in different outcomes than would-be copiers, so that data important 
to the emulators may never even be compiled. 
While these three components are fairly obvious, we think it is significant 
to break them out into a taxonomy, as we have done here, because various 
actors may or may not have access to, or incentives to share, all three.  That in 
turn will affect the costs of acquisition.  Consider, for example, the possibility 
that a locality may have reasons to conceal some of the data its experiments 
 
 
83
 DENNY A. ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 4 (2000).  
Another significant example here would be Ian Ayres’s story of state efforts to write antitakeover provisions 
that would survive Supreme Court scrutiny.  Once one such statute passed the gauntlet, others states could 
simply copy it.  Ayres, supra note 17, at 545. 
 
84
 Cf. von Hippel, supra note 59, at 431 (making this point about some industrial advances). 
 
85
 See James Forman Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 
17–19 (2004) (contrasting results in Chicago with other communities).  Some might argue that Delaware’s 
corporate law constitutes such an innovation, because the fine details about not only the law but also how it is 
administered and enforced are large contributors to its success or failure.  Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: 
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 276–78 (1985).  We expect to address the 
question in our next article. 
 
86
 VON HIPPEL, supra note 38, at 54; Hansen, supra note 59, at 87. 
 
87
 See KARCH, supra note 68, at 109–10; Note, supra note 71, at 1475. 
 
88
 E.g., Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight Under the 
Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 766–77, 817–24 (2000). 
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generate.  One leading commentator on policy diffusion claims that states will 
have no such incentives,89 but we think he is mistaken.  Even putting aside the 
self-interest of officials to outperform other officials, jurisdictions compete 
with one another.  It is a familiar point that states have a fiscal incentive to 
attract capital, jobs, and high-wealth individuals, while excluding those who 
will be a net drain on their economic resources, such as the unhealthy and 
unemployed.90  As others have also noted, one logical implication is that states 
will prefer to advertise the results of successful policy experiments, while 
concealing the negative effects of failures.91  However, as these commentators 
note, this advertising may be self-defeating, since it also transmits information 
to competitors, who can easily adopt the same policy and nullify any 
competitive gains.92  As a result, jurisdictions might not even bother to 
experiment, because they would be unable to publicize any gains they could 
produce.93 
Our simple taxonomy suggests that this analysis of “advertising” in turn 
overlooks the possibility that different forms of information may be valuable in 
different projects.  For instance, a jurisdiction could conceal its processes while 
announcing its experiment and results.94  If the processes are what generate 
value, then this is a successful competitive strategy: it both creates, and permits 
publicity of, competitive gains.95 
In other situations, there will likely be different combinations of state 
incentives to reveal or conceal.  In the case of redistributive benefits, states 
may wish to highlight their processes and conceal their outcomes.  In this way, 
the state could discourage in-migration in response to generous benefits—
hiding from potential beneficiaries the quality of the benefit, while raising the 
 
 
89
 Lazer, supra note 18, at 55. 
 
90
 See Daphne A. Kenyon, Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar.–
Apr. 1997, at 13, 14; Romano, supra note 85, at 228–29. 
 
91
 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1908, 1927–39 (1998); see also Christopher Hood, The Risk Game and the Blame Game, 37 GOV’T & 
OPPOSITION 15, 33 (2002); Lazer, supra note 18, at 63 (acknowledging that there are incentives to suppress 
negative information). 
 
92
 See Kamar, supra note 91, at 1927–39; see also Cai & Treisman, supra note 19, at 28 (arguing that 
innovations may be shared in a centralized system more readily due to the lack of concern for adoption of 
policies by competitors). 
 
93
 Cf. Kamar, supra note 91, at 1932 (claiming that experimentation is ineffectual because publicizing 
new law may result in no net gains for the state). 
 
94
 Cf. von Hippel, supra note 59, at 437–38 (describing how innovative firms with imperfect property 
rights devise systems for disclosing only limited portions of valuable innovations). 
 
95
 We will detail the significance of this possibility for the debate over the market for corporate charters 
in more depth in future work. 
GALLE&LEAHY GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:18:03 PM 
2009] LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY? 1355 
salience of the many bureaucratic hurdles that must be surmounted to acquire 
it.96  Local consumers of the good may still be able to appraise its quality, 
either because they directly consume it and have good measures for evaluating 
it, or because the state is able to disclose to them selectively the information it 
gathers about quality.  This allows voters to monitor the performance of their 
representatives without attracting unwanted outsiders. 
Still another combination of incentives might arise where a policy is 
enacted partially in response to rent-seeking by portions of the state 
constituency.97  In that scenario, the jurisdiction’s officials may prefer to 
conceal everything about its project, or, at most, to announce selectively only 
some results, such as an increase in jobs or tax revenues. The jurisdiction likely 
prefers to conceal from those who are disadvantaged by its experiment the fact 
that the experiment exists at all. 
b. Ease of Distribution 
Technological change can also strongly influence the costs of information, 
and therefore the incentives to innovate.  With the advent of the wired world, 
information and information networks have spread more widely than ever, 
which has reportedly greatly facilitated policy transfer.98  This implies that, 
while existing policies now will be shared more widely, there may well be 
fewer new policies in the first instance.  It is possible, though, that states still 
can refuse to compile information that would be valuable to outsiders, or take 
active steps to conceal information.99 
c. Access and Individual Incentives to Share 
To take one last example of where different forms of information may have 
different costs, consider the possibility that various channels for spreading 
 
 
96
 A standard assumption in public finance is that states prefer to set welfare benefits low in order to 
avoid attracting new beneficiaries.  Volden, supra note 74, at 792.  Empirical studies on whether changes in 
welfare policy affect in-migration are rather mixed.  See infra text accompanying note 134.  The dynamic we 
offer here could explain the failure of the data to support theory: when states are more generous to their own 
indigent population, they hide that fact from outsiders. 
 
97
 This would, of course, be a departure from the perfect agency relationship we assumed at the 
beginning of this Part.  But we could imagine a very similar analysis in the case of rent-seeking by a domestic 
firm at the expense of out-of-state individuals or firms. 
 
98
 E.g., KARCH, supra note 68, at 106–09, 121–24; Dolowitz & Marsh, supra note 18, at 7.  Indeed, 
Professor Karch claims that information is now so readily available that there is a danger that the glut of 
information could itself be a barrier to policy diffusion.  KARCH, supra note 68, at 7–8. 
 
99
 See Fenster, supra note 77, at 920–24. 
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information may have varying access to information and reasons for sharing it.  
Policies typically spread through one or more of a handful of avenues, 
including contacts among or movement by citizens, academics, firms, 
bureaucrats, and elected officials.100 
The differential incentives of public and private actors are particularly 
important to any thorough analysis because private actors lack access to a 
variety of information.  Unless they have worked in close partnership with 
government, private actors are unlikely to have information about internal 
processes.  If processes are what create the value of a particular innovation, 
then the incentives of private actors to share information may be largely 
irrelevant. 
So, for example, firms are likely to have different goals than academics or 
citizens.  All else being equal, a firm that does business across many 
jurisdictions is likely to want a fair degree of policy uniformity in order to 
control compliance costs.101  Thus, firms tend to favor uniformity, sometimes 
at the cost of achieving the “best” outcome by whatever measure.  Citizens and 
academics seem likely to want to obtain their subjectively most-preferred 
policy, and will want to bring such a policy developed elsewhere to their own 
abode.  And academics, we feel well-qualified to suggest, are prone to 
“evangelize”—they would like to see others outside their own home adopt 
their view of the best policies.  In all of these cases, information will spread 
fairly readily, perhaps depressing innovation in the long run. 
In contrast, officials may prefer to keep policy information close to the 
vest.  First, it is well-known that public officials are likely to have self-selected 
their profession on the basis of their ideological commitments.102  That is, one 
of the primary rewards of government service is the opportunity to obtain 
policy outcomes,103 so public officials are more likely to evangelize—to want 
to see their own ideas of the “best” outcome enacted not only for themselves, 
but everywhere.  At the same time, there may be either complementary or 
conflicting self-interest narratives.  If bureaucrats are rewarded by their 
 
 
100
 See KARCH, supra note 68, at 106–09, 121–24; VON HIPPEL, supra note 38, at 18, 77, 90; Stone, supra 
note 73, at 545–61 (discussing the diffusion of policies). 
 
101
 Busch et al., supra note 65, at 152. 
 
102
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limits and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
623, 694–96 (1996) (noting that structural features of political processes may attract those who find the 
opportunities those processes offer appealing). 
 
103
 See Steven Kelman, Why Public Ideas Matter, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 31, 46 (Robert B. 
Reich ed., 1988) (reporting surveys of officials). 
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legislatures for good performances relative to the performance of bureaucracies 
in other places, and the bureaucrats are motivated by those rewards, they may 
prefer to conceal information.  On the other hand, if the main self-interested 
motivator for bureaucrats is status among their peers, they may well prefer to 
go to conferences and boast in detail about their own accomplishments. 
In short, the flow of information needed to copy an innovation will be 
highly contingent, to a degree that likely defies generalization.  Still, we have 
identified preliminarily some factors that would ease or congest information 
flows, and in turn reduce or encourage innovation. 
3. Costs of Adopting 
Fortunately, the analysis of the last important free-riding factor, the costs of 
adopting new policies, is somewhat simpler, although data are scanty.  The 
basic idea is that it is not costless for localities to copy the innovations of 
others.104  If the costs of copying are comparable to, or even higher than, the 
costs of experiment, the jurisdiction might as well experiment.  In a 
competitive scenario, in which governments will not initiate new policies 
unless it gives them a competitive advantage, high copying costs also can 
promote innovation.105  Because a potential innovator knows that others cannot 
easily copy it, the innovator is likely to reap some competitive reward from its 
invention.106  It therefore has an incentive to do so.  These factors suggest that 
copying costs may be an important part of the innovation story. 
To add some nuance to this story, consider how rational states would 
determine whether to innovate.  Assume that a given policy has value and that 
there is an extra premium for being among the first to adopt that policy.  If the 
cost of copying is zero, a state should be willing to innovate only where the 
premium for innovating exceeds the entire cost of innovation.107  As the costs 
of copying increase and approach the costs of innovation, the size of the 
premium for moving first needed to prompt innovation should decline to 
 
 
104
 Kerber & Eckhardt, supra note 43, at 234. 
 
105
 Romano, supra note 85, at 235–36. 
 
106
 Id. 
 
107
 See Ayres, supra note 17, at 547.  That is, if we can obtain the exact same value by copying as by 
innovating, we should only be willing to incur the additional costs of copying where the value of moving first 
exceeds those additional costs.  A bit more formally (and with apologies to our economist readers for our 
refusal to use unnecessary Greek letters), let Vp = value of a policy, Vf = value of implementing that policy 
first, Ci = cost of innovating, and Cc = cost of copying.  A state should innovate where Vf + Vp – Ci > Vp – Cc.  
If we set Cc = 0, and cancel the identical Vp term on either side, then the state innovates if and only if             
Vf – Ci > 0. 
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zero.
108
  For instance, in the extreme case, if a state faces the same costs 
whether it moves first or second, and moving first has any premium at all, it 
should move first.  These predictions imply that we will see more innovation 
as copying costs rise; it is very easy to overcome the first-mover premium 
hurdle when copying costs are high relative to innovation costs. 
In addition, suppose that the size of the first-mover premium depends on 
how many other states copy.  If the costs of copying generally are high, and the 
value of a project varies from state to state, some other states may elect not to 
copy.  In that instance, the first-mover premium should rise.109  Thus, higher 
copying costs both lower the size of the first-mover premium needed to trigger 
innovation and also increase the size of that premium.110 
What, then, do we know about copying costs?  Commentators have 
identified a variety of costs, some rather subtle, that could accompany copying 
a policy, and we would like to point out a few others, as well.  Obviously, there 
may be training and infrastructure expenses.111  A more refined version of that 
point is the possibility that the new project depends on successful copying of 
various internal government processes, which may be expensive to transition 
into.112 
 
 
108
 Glazer & Kondo, supra note 19, at 10.  Mathematically, where Ci = Cc, those terms cancel, so there 
would be innovation if and only if Vf > 0.  In intermediate cases, we have Vf − Ci > −Cc.  For instance, let 
Ci = 100 and Cc = 50.  In that case, we have: (Vf  − 100 > −50) = (Vf > 50).  If Cc = 25, then we have:            
(Vf  − 100 > −25) = (Vf > 75).  Again, the point is that, as the costs of copying decline, with all else being 
equal, the premium for moving first must get larger and larger to make innovation attractive. 
 
109
 We think this is a plausible assumption.  Oligopolists typically command smaller rents when they must 
divide the pie more ways and defend against more defectors.  Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 742 (2002). 
 
110
 At the risk of making the reader’s head explode, we note that there is yet a further complication here: 
low copying costs may increase not only the first-mover premium but also the premium to the second mover 
for being ahead of the third mover.  If that is true, then the first-mover premium diminishes.  This whole 
sequence is iterative, as third-mover premia diminish second-mover premia, which then increase the first-
mover advantage, and so on. 
 
111
 Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping 
Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 149 (2000); Wejnert, supra note 18, at 301. 
 
112
 That is the essence of corporate scholars’ argument, we think, about the costs of competing with 
Delaware in the administration of corporate law.  Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 111, at 149; Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
469, 500 (1987); Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 134, 150 (2006).  For now, we remain on the sidelines of this debate, except to say that the question of 
what constitutes an innovation in Delaware corporate law—and, as such, what must be replicated for a second 
mover to copy such an innovation—warrants further explication. 
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One other implication of the competition for outside capital is that 
disuniformity is costly.  We noted before that firms often prefer uniform rules 
across jurisdictions.  Being the second or third state to move to a new rule, 
when there are forty-seven or so with a different, uniform rule, may drive away 
or prevent the influx of multi-jurisdictional firms. 
Similarly, failed experiments may have lasting effects on a locality’s ability 
to compete for capital.  There is some risk that an experiment, even if 
successful elsewhere, will prove a bad fit in a different jurisdiction.113  In 
addition to the direct welfare consequences of this bad fit, a jurisdiction can 
also pay an additional price by driving out mobile firms.  Because there are 
inevitable relocation costs, once a firm has departed it may not be possible to 
lure it back simply by restoring the jurisdiction to its old state.  The jurisdiction 
must offer amenities or other enticements of sufficient value to overcome the 
moving costs.  There could also be enduring negative reputational effects. 
Still, it should be possible to minimize many of these risks simply by 
waiting longer.114  If the first jurisdiction to invent a policy is not particularly 
similar to a prospective copier, the copier can just wait for a third, more similar 
state to copy, and observe the effects there as well.  Waiting for other adopters 
also obviously diminishes the impact of disuniformity.  Thus, disuniformity 
and the risks of failure are less significant in the long term than other copying 
costs. 
In short, as a matter of theory it appears the most important copying costs 
are the most basic ones: the costs of obtaining information about, and putting 
into place, a policy developed elsewhere.  That is a happy outcome, because 
unlike some of the other costs we mention—say, the cost of offering credible 
commitments not to extract rents—these basic costs seem to us most 
susceptible to empirical measurement.  Accordingly, it should be possible to 
test our hypothesis by examining whether states are more likely to innovate in 
policy areas where these costs are high.  Similarly, if our theory is right, then 
we should be able to predict those policy areas where federalism is least 
productive: when copying costs are low, states will be less innovative.  For 
now there is a need for more data before we can accurately assess the extent to 
which decentralized innovation is underprovided. 
 
 
113
 Dolowitz & Marsh, supra note 18, at 17–18; see also Tyran & Sausgruber, supra note 74, at 427–28 
(“[E]mulating a policy which has proven to be successful in some other state is risky, too.”). 
 
114
 Brooks, supra note 39, at 704.  This is another version of the “option value” of moving second we 
mentioned earlier.  See supra text accompanying note 39. 
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4. Summing Up 
Given the many factors at work here, and the paucity of real-world studies 
of many of them, it is difficult to generalize about the existence of free-rider 
effects.  One thing that seems clear is that those who assert that in all cases 
there obviously is or obviously is not a free-rider problem are likely mistaken.  
There are also at least a few strong trends. 
First, innovation is most likely to occur where it will be least useful to 
others.  Free-riding is less appealing where jurisdictions are highly dissimilar 
and would be unable to utilize the information generated by observing others.  
Similarly, if copying costs are high, or information scarce, jurisdictions will 
know they must strike out on their own if they want to improve on their 
existing methods.115  Moreover, in a competitive environment in which 
copying is difficult, each locality will be able to reap more rewards from 
innovation because there will be few competitors able to offer the new policy. 
Although there may be more innovation in this environment, the overall 
societal gains from innovation will be small.  Instead of diffusing throughout 
the country, or throughout the world or region, each new policy or method will 
benefit only those in the innovating state.  That could suggest that, from the 
standpoint of overall welfare, it might be preferable to locate most government 
authority centrally, because experimentation seems not to add much to the 
good of the country at large. 
The possibility that centralization might be superior leads us to the second 
important lesson we take from our survey thus far: some, but not all, 
innovation depends on the absence of spillovers.  In the case of highly 
dissimilar jurisdictions, there is innovation because, contrary to the 
assumptions of the free-rider scenario, there is little or no information 
externality.  Information generated in one place is just not that useful in others.  
That is not the case with the situation in which there is innovation because 
information is scarce or costly, or is costly to employ.  In those instances, 
potential spillovers may still be quite high if the other barriers to diffusion 
could be overcome. 
 
 
115
 Thus, we disagree strongly with Karch, who in a brief passage at the end of his thorough survey of 
policy diffusion claims that the fact of effective diffusion and readily available information supports the notion 
of states as laboratories of democracy.  KARCH, supra note 68, at 205.  The proper inference is exactly the 
opposite: very good information and easy diffusion of policies should produce less innovation, not more. 
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This difference suggests a policy prescription we have not seen elsewhere 
in the literature.  RA notes that a centralized planner can prompt innovation by 
offering grants or prizes to local innovators, presumably in amounts tied to the 
approximate size of the externality they produce.116  In this way, the federated 
government will produce something like an efficient amount of 
experimentation.  Others, such as Dorf and Sabel, have built on this 
suggestion, offering elaborate mechanisms for eliciting and rewarding local 
experiments.117  Our work here implies that these efforts are of interest only in 
the case where there in fact is a significant externality—that is, in the 
information-deficit or high-cost scenarios.  When local jurisdictions are highly 
heterogeneous, and externalities are small, there is minimal inefficiency, and 
therefore no real case for centralized intervention. 
Finally, we can confirm RA’s general observation about the conditions in 
which free-riding occurs, and that these conditions are likely to arise in the real 
world with some frequency.  Through the many loops of our analysis, we were 
unable to undermine the possibility that there will be republics in which states 
are at least somewhat similar, copying is at least somewhat affordable, and 
information is at least somewhat available.  That is, and remains, the 
prescription for free-riding. 
B. Is There a First-Mover Advantage? 
The fact that states have an incentive to free ride does not necessarily mean 
that states will not innovate.  If there are substantial advantages to being the 
first to implement a new policy, and those advantages outweigh any 
accompanying costs, then the excess represents value that cannot be obtained 
merely by free-riding.118  In this section, we sketch the likely tradeoffs.  We 
find that for most jurisdictions it is a gamble whether any first-mover premium 
will exceed the risks of innovation.  That tends to confirm RA’s prediction that 
the appeal of innovation will depend on local preferences for risk.119 
In our view, the most obvious benefit of moving first, although one we 
have not seen discussed in any depth in the literature, is time discounting: All 
other things being equal, it is better to have the benefits of a successful 
 
 
116
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 615–16. 
 
117
 Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 191–205; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–23 (1998); Giampaolo Garzarelli, Cognition, 
Incentives, and Public Governance, 34 PUB. FIN. REV. 235, 236–52 (2006). 
 
118
 Ayres, supra note 17, at 548. 
 
119
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 606. 
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experiment sooner than later.  Some of these time benefits are concrete.  A 
jurisdiction that is more efficient with its funds can invest the savings and 
produce more public goods or impose lower taxes in future years.120 
In some instances, time discounting and the incentive to move first may 
increase innovation but reduce nationwide welfare.  Some innovative policies 
may be new strategies for producing negative externalities, which can lead to 
the notorious “race to the bottom.”121  For instance, a state might discover a 
new way to impose higher taxes on outside businesses.122  Neighboring states 
may retaliate, but if there is a limit on the degree to which states can impose 
retaliatory costs, then moving first, and investing the gains, may leave the first-
moving discriminator ahead overall.123 
Other benefits from acting first will be more ineffable.  For instance, 
studies suggest that individuals have highly varying future discount rates.124  
Some people strongly prefer immediate consumption over savings, even if the 
market-rate present-discounted value of the savings substantially exceeds 
present consumption.125  In jurisdictions where this “excessive” future 
discounting is prevalent, moving first will be correspondingly more attractive.  
There is a tradeoff between moving first and waiting to acquire valuable 
information from others; future discounters will tend to view the gains from 
waiting as smaller.  Of course, the size of the discount also depends on the time 
it takes to acquire and implement a copied policy; discounting may not be 
significant, even if citizens are heavy future discounters, if copying takes only 
a few months.  On the other hand, even modest future discounting might 
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 That is, there is a time value of money.  E.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 637, 657–63 (1997). 
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 Busch et al., supra note 65, at 152; E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: 
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 329 (1985). 
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 Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 
908, 962–63 (1992); see also id. at 973–74 (noting that to the extent that states experiment, they may be 
attempting to perfect methods of discriminating in favor of their own residents). 
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greatly diminish the appeal of waiting ten years to gather information about the 
outcomes of an experiment elsewhere. 
Next, as Professor Ribstein has pointed out, first-mover jurisdictions can 
create an opportunity for their citizens to obtain special expertise.126  In the 
corporate charter example Ribstein describes, Delaware’s attorneys and courts 
develop familiarity with Delaware corporate law before their competitors in 
other states.127  If these other states then adopt Delaware law, the Delaware 
actors will be more familiar with the second-mover states’ laws than the 
attorneys in those states, giving Delaware’s citizens at least a temporary 
advantage.128  To the extent that reputational effects are persistent, this 
advantage may last longer than the actual period in which Delaware attorneys’ 
expertise really is superior.129  The same could as easily be true of automotive 
engineers or pharmacists.  While this represents a fairly small welfare gain in 
the context of the state as a whole, political dynamics, in particular those 
described by public choice theory, might magnify the likelihood that the small 
welfare effect translates into a large incentive for the state’s officials to act.130 
A third possibility, as we mentioned briefly in the last section, is that 
jurisdictions may be motivated by policy evangelism.131  That is, they want to 
innovate because they believe their innovation makes the world a better place, 
and they want to see it spread as widely as practicable.132  Thus, the spillover is 
likely not an externality at all, as the benevolent or ideological voters feel some 
emotional or spiritual reward whenever another jurisdiction learns about their 
invention.  It is unclear, however, to what extent it will ever be the case that a 
majority of voters in a jurisdiction will take such a view.  Thus, the opportunity 
to share the good word about new policy will generate only small benefits to 
each state, and, depending on one’s view about what comprises perfect agency, 
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representative officials might set aside this view altogether.  Again, though, 
there may be a possible public choice story one could tell here about such 
voters. 
There is another set of potential first-mover advantages that arises in a 
world in which firms and individuals are mobile across jurisdictions.  There is 
strong evidence that firms move in response to packages of taxes and 
amenities.133  Evidence on individuals is more mixed, but generally suggests 
that at the margins most people are sensitive to government-offered 
amenities.134 
Assuming, then, that mobility is a relevant consideration, moving first may 
offer the opportunity to attract and retain desirable firms or migrants.135  
Corporate law scholars have argued that first movers can lock in some gains 
from their innovation, although only at the cost of offering a bond that they 
will not confiscate from newcomers the rewards of the policy.136  We would 
add that the need to offer a bond is small when the newcomer faces very small 
moving costs.  If the firm can relocate cheaply in response to efforts to 
confiscate locational rents, it will not fear those efforts and needs little 
guarantee.  While this makes bonding cheaper for the locality, it also 
diminishes the first-mover advantage because the jurisdiction cannot 
effectively impose taxes on the rents it creates for the firm.137  On the other 
hand, by alternative metrics there are still first-mover gains.  For instance, the 
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firm may employ local residents, attract other less mobile firms, and otherwise 
improve the community in places other than its budget.138 
Against these potential gains, whether from mobility or otherwise, states 
must balance the costs of being the first to put in place a new policy or process.  
Some of the costs are predictable.  There are inevitable start-up costs, such as 
research, training, technical advice for the private sector, and construction of 
any needed infrastructure.139  If resources are relatively fixed, or there are 
diminishing returns from increased taxation, then any investment in the new 
venture will bear opportunity costs.  Similarly, on the reasonable assumption 
that a state’s citizens and public officials do not have unlimited time and effort 
to debate their policy choices, choosing to embark on an experiment may mean 
giving up an opportunity to enact other, possibly more beneficial, policies.140  
Experiments seem likely to take more decisional effort than copying, so the 
opportunity cost of one experiment may be the chance to copy two or three 
others.  As we explained earlier, these costs contribute to the option value of 
waiting—an opportunity cost first movers must sacrifice to innovate.141 
Moreover, as we have already seen, innovation represents a break from the 
status quo; if the status quo is held widely in common among jurisdictions, the 
innovator must bear the cost of disuniformity.  Firms may exit in response to 
higher compliance costs, although conceivably this exit could also be a boon 
for remaining local competitors.142  Exit may have pyramiding costs, especially 
if some of the value of doing business in the jurisdiction derives from network 
effects—that is, from the fact that geographic proximity to partners or rivals 
creates value, as in the classic Silicon Valley example.143 
Most problematically, many experiments fail.144  One cost of innovation is 
thus the chance that the new policy will produce results even worse than the 
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old policy.  Here, the time-discounting question is flipped on its head.  If new 
policies, even new policies copied from others, sometimes go wrong, then it is 
better to wait to implement them and put off the cost of failure.  Furthermore, 
failure may also trigger exit, with the potential pyramiding of losses that exit 
may entail.145 
Given the high degree of uncertainty that evidently attaches to moving first, 
the ultimate effect of first-mover premia will likely depend on how 
jurisdictions view risk.  According to RA, the prospect of a risk of large losses, 
from whatever source, should tend to dissuade states from experimenting.146  
Different citizens within the jurisdiction, she claims, will have different 
preferences for risk-taking.147  She suggests that only relatively risk-seeking 
jurisdictions will experiment, and that voters are unlikely to sort by risk 
preference.148  We are unaware of any studies on this last point, but it seems 
plausible.  Moving is costly and the choice of jurisdiction turns on many 
factors in addition to risk preference.149  Indeed, we have seen in this section 
alone at least two other sets of preferences—time-discounting and policy 
“evangelism”—that citizens might sort by.  It is also probably costly to obtain 
information about the risk preferences of other jurisdictions, and thus costly 
even to know where to move to satisfy one’s preference.  According to RA, the 
implication that follows from these facts is that jurisdictions will not tend to 
experiment, regardless of first-mover premia, because risk preferrers will be a 
minority in each jurisdiction.150 
We disagree with RA that it is necessarily the case that risk preferrers will 
not form majorities.  Although citizens may not sort based on their preferences 
for risk, they may well sort along other characteristics that correlate with risk 
preference.  For instance, there is evidence that risk preference is tied to 
wealth,151 and strong evidence that people are sorted by wealth.152  It follows 
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that simply by random sorting there will be some jurisdictions with a majority 
of voters with a strong preference for risk.  Thus, while the riskiness of being a 
first mover may reduce the number of jurisdictions that will do so, we think 
RA somewhat overstates the size of that diminution. 
As a result, the presence of a first-mover premium may at times encourage 
innovation.  Moreover, as a given innovation becomes less risky for a given 
jurisdiction, or as it becomes more difficult for citizens to exit in response to 
unwanted risk, it is increasingly likely that the jurisdiction’s populace will 
achieve a critical mass of those willing to take on the risk of that new policy.  
Correspondingly, low innovation costs, high costs of exit, and the ability to 
hedge risk all should contribute to innovation. 
These predictions about first-mover advantages are supported by the 
observation, reported in several studies, that large states are the primary 
sources of innovation.153  Size tends to cure many of the downsides of being a 
first mover.  More populous states with ample resources are better able to 
absorb the cost of experiment in one or two budget areas, and can more easily 
diversify against the risk of failure.154  Some commentators report that policy 
innovation, because it is so dependent on government expertise, rewards 
economies of scale in developing skilled bureaucrats and monitoring their 
progress.155  More populous states may have a wider range of policy benefits to 
offer residents, making it less likely that residents will leave due to any single 
policy decision.  Economically thriving states are costly to exit because 
departing entails giving up the advantages of living in the successful area.156  
Thus, while there are a variety of costs that undercut the first-mover advantage, 
it appears to remain the case that the benefits exceed costs for at least some 
large, well-off states. 
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C. Will States Really Experiment? 
We have established that in some conditions it is likely that localities will 
initiate new policies.  This is still a step short of demonstrating that states 
achieve Brandeis’s “laboratories” of democracy.  For reasons we explore in a 
moment, it is possible that instead of experiments, states all simply pluck what 
seem to them to be the lowest hanging new fruits, rather than sorting among all 
of the available alternatives to select the most appealing.  Further, there 
appears to be no incentive for jurisdictions to report experiments gone wrong, 
leaving open the possibility that there will be wasteful duplication of both 
successes and failures. 
As Koleman Strumpf has observed, in theory the ideal way to structure a 
series of policy experiments would be to carry out a different project in each of 
several experimenting jurisdictions.157  In this way, each state can benefit from 
the information about alternative approaches generated by its neighbors, and 
then all can switch to the most successful.  Strumpf therefore predicts that 
where information flows freely, we should see a wide diversity of state 
experiments, as each successive experimenting state chooses a different option 
from its neighbors in order to maximize the amount of information available to 
it.158 
The flaw in this theory is that not all experimental policies are of equal 
expected value.159  Some experiments may be more likely to succeed, have a 
higher expected return, or both.  As Cai and Treisman argue, the additional 
information generated by choosing the experiment with the second-best 
expected value is in large measure a positive externality.160  They claim that 
one should therefore expect that jurisdictions will choose that path rather less 
often than would a planner who could optimize social welfare—say, a central 
planner capable of directing experiments in various controlled experimental 
subdivisions.161 
We find Cai and Treisman more persuasive.  In particular, we think states 
will be reluctant to select an experiment that could result in lower returns than 
the status quo—that is, they are risk averse.  Cai and Treisman argue that risk 
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aversion arises because localities cannot easily diversify against the lost 
opportunity of selecting the highest-expected-value experiment.162  As we have 
just seen, it appears that at least larger states in fact can do so.  More 
significant, to our minds, is the fact that failed experiments can carry heavy 
costs.  The first-best experiment is attractive not only because of its potential 
gains, but also because of the lower likelihood it will produce damaging 
losses.163  Both halves of the risk/reward equation are relevant to determining 
the appeal of a prospective new policy.  In addition, due to the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth, states will avoid wagers that offer modest positive 
expected value even after accounting for these dangers. 
In short, the expected value of the added information a state itself gains by 
choosing the second-best experiment is likely to be greatly outweighed by the 
expected costs of giving up the first-best choice.  Unless the states are able to 
internalize the benefits the new information provides to all other states, they 
are likely all to choose the same, first-best experiment.  Rather than a 
laboratory with many different experiments, we would have the same 
experiment repeated many times. 
Of course, this analysis assumes that all jurisdictions perceive the expected 
value of the potential options similarly.  As a number of commentators have 
observed, that is not necessarily the case.164  We have seen that different states 
might have different tastes for risk, different policy goals, different degrees of 
time-discounting, and different degrees to which they internalize the benefits 
of spillovers through evangelism effects.  Some localities might simply not be 
aware of some of the available options.  Thus, the literature predicts that, as the 
number of jurisdictions increases, there should be, by random chance, a greater 
diversity of policy experiments.165  Particular communities will happen to have 
clusters of risk-lovers, heavy-discounters, or the like. 
We would add that diversity should also increase as the ease of individual 
sorting on any of these characteristics increases.  That is, as it becomes easier 
for voters to choose to live in a place with other citizens who share their 
preference for risk, evangelism, or other attitudes toward innovation, it should 
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be more likely that we will see communities in which the majority or median 
voters evaluate experiments differently than their neighbors. 
However, even in a nation with many states, or in which sorting were very 
easy, there might still be less information about policy alternatives than 
optimal because of disincentives to report failures.  For a central planner, the 
fact that a given alternative is unsuccessful is valuable, because it prevents 
needless duplication of that experiment, may serve as a helpful control for 
other experiments, and might offer lessons for new generations of 
experiments.166  As we set out in our summary of incentives to share and 
acquire information about successful experiments, states are likely to make it 
costly for others to acquire information about their own failures, and other 
states are likely to suffer collective action problems in incurring the expense 
needed to gather any data from each other.  That is likely doubly true of 
information about failures, particularly if jurisdictions are competitive. 
D. Free-Riding Summary 
Thus, to this point our picture, although certainly very complex, looks 
rather like RA’s sketch.  Localities are likely to innovate at a level below the 
social optimum when it is relatively inexpensive for others to acquire 
information about, and to adopt, others’ experiments.  Empirical data on the 
prevalence of those conditions is presently thin, but we offered good 
theoretical reasons to believe both might arise with some frequency.  Further, 
the possibility of gains from being the first mover, irrespective of copying by 
others, seems to us unlikely to balance fully the free-rider effect.  Innovating 
carries potential losses as well as gains, and anecdotally, at least, it appears that 
it is the jurisdictions most capable of bearing those costs that are willing to 
innovate.  At a minimum, then, there is social underprovision of 
experimentation by small jurisdictions.  Finally, we observed that the quality of 
the information generated, even in a regime with a high degree of 
experimentation, is likely below the theoretical ideal.  There is a tendency, 
which diminishes as the number of jurisdictions and the ease of voter Tiebout 
sorting increases, for localities all to choose the same experiment when they 
decide to deviate from the status quo.  Even in a world with many open 
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jurisdictions, we do not see much prospect that states will voluntarily disclose 
to outsiders information about unsuccessful policies. 
III. AGENCY COSTS AND OFFICIAL RISK AVERSION 
In this Part, we relax our assumption that elected officials are perfect agents 
of the public.  Instead, adopting a lens of public choice theory, we assume that 
officials act primarily to further their own ends.  Typically, imperfect agents 
are said to reduce social welfare, because they fail to deliver services the 
public prefers.167  RA’s critics have maintained, though, that self-serving 
officials can actually increase national well-being, by disregarding the risk-
avoiding preferences of their local constituents in favor of recognition from 
outside their present voting base.  Supposedly, the urge to win a reputation as 
an innovator spurs politicians to take risks their constituents would not.168  This 
Part is aimed primarily at scrutinizing that claim, as well as other related ones.  
In sections A and B, we argue that, as a general matter, we should expect 
rational, self-serving officials to be more averse to innovation than their 
constituents, not less.  In section C, we weigh the various possible ways in 
which outside influences, such as the chance of earning a strong reputation 
with outsiders, might motivate officials.  In the later sections, we add some 
variations, accounting for the possibility of irrational incumbent officials, 
agenda-setting by challengers, and the influence of political parties. 
A. The Base Case of Risk-Averse Officials 
RA’s basic account is that even risk-neutral public servants may behave as 
though risk averse because of the way that popular preferences are translated 
into electoral success.169  Although her support of this point is fairly technical, 
the underlying intuition is straightforward.  The decision to innovate in one 
policy area is only a small aspect of a given candidate’s reelection chances.  If 
we assume that candidates are motivated primarily by the likelihood of 
reelection, for a candidate who is already likely to win, there are diminishing 
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returns to taking added risks.170  For instance, a candidate with a 99% chance 
of victory is unlikely to want to take a gamble that would offer equal chances 
of a 10%  positive or negative change in her victory odds, because she benefits 
relatively little from the added upside but is still vulnerable to the downside.  
She should prefer to protect her current position, just as a manager with “in the 
money” options will avoid taking risks that might diminish the value of her 
investments.171  However, a candidate who is “out of the money”—highly 
unlikely to win reelection—has a lot to gain from taking large risks, because 
she will get nothing unless her risk pays off.172 
If RA’s analysis is correct, the fact that most incumbents in the United 
States are secure should result in social underprovision of innovation.173  Most 
candidates with the power to set policy—the incumbents—will be in a position 
where they will be reluctant to take even good bets.  Thus, whatever their 
personal proclivity for risk, incumbents will refuse to pursue new policies 
whose particular outcomes are not fully certain, but whose average expected 
value on the whole would be a net positive. 
To this we would add that one should expect that, on average, politicians, 
like other undiversified managers, will tend to be risk averse whatever their 
odds of reelection.  This point is almost a truism in the field of executive 
compensation, but it seems not to have often been applied to public officials.174  
Assuming a diminishing marginal utility of money, individuals will be risk 
averse with their own wealth.175  If salary is a significant portion of individual 
wealth, or being fired or demoted would negatively impact opportunities for 
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future wealth, then the agent will be risk averse relative to the principal’s 
preferences.176  Similarly, undiversified investors will be risk averse with their 
stakes.177  A traditional solution to these problems is to design contracts that 
will encourage the agent to be more risk-seeking.178  For whatever reasons, 
governments in the United States do not pursue this strategy.179  Thus, because 
public servants are undiversified and subject only to fairly low-powered 
incentives, they should tend to avoid risk.180  Moreover, an individual who 
chooses government over other professions, knowing of the compensation 
structure, may well make that choice precisely because she prefers the security 
of government work over the pressure of highly incentivized compensation 
schemes elsewhere.181 
These tendencies toward risk aversion may be somewhat tempered by the 
fact that officials can enact more than one policy.  Thus, while an official 
cannot easily diversify her investment in her job, she can diversify her risk in 
any given project by seeking to enact many projects.182  As we have already 
shown, though, that diversification strategy is difficult for officials in 
jurisdictions without enough resources and policy autonomy to pursue multiple 
avenues at once.  Additionally, if an official must expend some kind of 
political effort or capital in order to push forward each project, there is likely a 
limit on the number of projects she can pursue seriously in any given term in 
office.183  If the number is fairly low, the diversification benefits will be 
relatively small. 
Another offsetting factor potentially weighing against risk aversion is the 
possibility that an official will serve more than one term in office.  A safe 
incumbent has relatively little to gain in her next election from enacting risky 
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policies.  However, at the time she must decide on the policy, she is unlikely to 
know whether she would be secure in any subsequent elections—say, a 
reelection campaign four years down the road, or a campaign next year for 
higher office.  If a successful policy can create lasting goodwill with the 
electorate, increasing the odds of victory in those subsequent contests, then 
risky innovations may have more upside than RA’s basic risk-aversion story 
suggests.184 
Nonetheless, we expect that the size of this added upside will be small.  
Any future gains must be discounted for both time and uncertainty.185  Both the 
psychic and material rewards of office have a time value.186  Uncertainty is 
also pervasive in almost all aspects of the decision.  The candidate may change 
her mind about running in another election, voter preferences may change in a 
way that would alter the expected payoffs of the innovation, and the candidate 
may be unable to project how enduring the rewards from success would 
prove.187 
Whatever the outcome of these crosscurrents, if elected officials are 
sometimes risk averse, bureaucrats, too, may tend to be risk averse in this 
story.188  Obviously, bureaucrats are not directly motivated by the need for 
reelection, and civil service protections will tend to remove any fear of 
downside risk from taking professional risks.189  However, elected officials 
may be judged by the electorate in part on the performance of the government 
as a whole,190 and, knowing this, have developed a variety of tools for 
 
 
184
 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 601–05. 
 
185
 See Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 158–59; Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, The Politics of 
Ambiguity, 105 Q. J. ECON. 829, 838–39 (1990). 
 
186
 That is, taking on a 10% chance of losing a $100,000 salary now in exchange for an extra 10% chance 
of gaining an additional four years of salary four years from now is a bad bet. 
 
187
 However, future discounting could lead to risk-taking in the (probably rare) instance that a policy risk 
will not pay off until far in the future.  Heavy discounting of those future risks might lead officials to enact 
policy even where the short-term benefits are fairly small. 
 
188
 We limit our analysis here to elected officials and appointed bureaucrats.  Arguably, judges, too, make 
policy, and for some, the incentives to innovate or not may be similar to those that motivate other officials.  
We postpone more extensive discussion of the judiciary to later work and thank Rob Mikos for raising this 
issue. 
 
189
 RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM 
OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 2–8 (1994); see also Cumming 
& MacIntosh, supra note 111, at 145 (observing that team-production structure of bureaucracy reduces the 
power of individual incentives). 
 
190
 See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United 
States, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 50–52 (2003). 
GALLE&LEAHY GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:18:03 PM 
2009] LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY? 1375 
encouraging the bureaucracy to share the officials’ goals.191  For instance, both 
the legislature and the chief executive can expand or constrict an agency’s 
budget or policy authority.192  That can be an effective lever for moving 
bureaucrats, who may be motivated largely by a desire to carry out their 
perceived governmental mission, to be sensitive to the officials’ own 
reluctance to undertake risky policy.193  To be sure, there is “slack”—elected 
officials cannot perfectly monitor and incentivize their unelected agents.194  
But it is unclear whether agency officials will use this freedom to pursue new 
policies that effectuate their perceived mission, or simply use it to enjoy more 
leisure time.195  Moreover, civil service positions, even more than other 
government jobs, tend to draw individuals who prefer to eschew professional 
risk.196 
Overall, the basic prediction is that, when we begin to account for the 
possibility that public officials are imperfect agents, the trend will be toward 
less innovation than the general public should prefer.  Innovation is risky, and 
officials, at this point, look likely to be risk averse.  These claims are testable.  
If these predictions are true, we should find that insecure politicians are more 
innovative, and that those who enact major projects tend to lose their next 
election.197 
B. Risk Aversion and Innovation Under Public Choice Theory 
A significant problem with the analysis so far is that it assumes a highly 
simplified version of official incentives and public preferences.  We assumed 
that officials are motivated only by the desire to obtain reelection, and that they 
do so entirely by securing votes.  Moreover, we assumed (following RA) in our 
discussion of the returns from innovation that voters reward officials simply on 
the basis of whether a policy succeeded or failed, without regard to whether 
some voters might have more intense opinions about the success or failure of a 
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given project.  All of these assumptions are inaccurate, as public choice theory 
has recognized for many years.198  Voters can be more or less intensely 
interested in a program, and this intensity is important in light of the fact that 
the average voter is rationally ignorant of political outcomes, preferring to free 
ride on the efforts of others in monitoring government.199  Intensely motivated 
actors can organize to contribute effort, information, and money to candidates, 
who can use these tools to shape the opinions of less motivated sectors of the 
electorate, lending these organized groups disproportionate political 
influence.200  In addition, officials may be motivated by more than reelection—
for instance, they can obtain private side payments from interested actors.201 
Including these features in our analysis adds a lot of complexity but not 
much in the way of new conclusions.  For instance, the possibility of side 
payments from interest groups could theoretically either increase or decrease 
risk aversion, and it is hard to predict which effect would dominate.  On the 
one hand, unlike the manager of a firm, an elected official who loses her job 
might actually improve her financial prospects.  The possibility of a soft 
landing—a cushy consulting job with a favored industry, say—after an 
electoral loss should soften candidates’ fears of losing.202  On the other hand, if 
some payments can be collected during a term in office (for instance, through a 
spouse employed as a lobbyist), or if future benefits can be piled up higher and 
higher, then the stakes for an incumbent in remaining in office to continue 
collecting her rents are even higher.203 
Even sticking purely to electoral concerns, the influence of intensely 
motivated actors is still hard to predict.  The opportunity to please a 
particularly influential group with a successful experiment might lead 
candidates to give increased weight to the potential upside of innovations.204  
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The same group or another influential one, however, may also be equally 
displeased with a failed experiment, yielding a larger weighting of the 
downside, as well.  Even if interest groups encourage some experiments, those 
experiments may not necessarily be welfare-enhancing.205  If the interest group 
has preferences at odds with the general public’s, learning how to achieve 
those preferences more effectively would lower, not increase, overall 
welfare.206  When lobbying produces new projects, they may be pure rents—
transfers of resources, with little experimental component.  For instance, as RA 
points out, so-called “demonstration” projects may be a veil for selectively 
allocating resources to a favored region or coalition.207 
More generally, while rent-seeking may produce new programs, the 
direction of interest-group influence seems to be somewhat toward preserving 
the status quo.  First, those who hold influence already will tend to be happy 
with the status quo.208  Second, interest groups are more likely to form around 
an existing entitlement, rather than the effort to create a new one.209  Recipients 
of the extant entitlement are easier for would-be organizers to identify; 
entitlements often come with technical assistance funding, which facilitates 
organizing; and the presence of the entitlement enriches the coalition, giving it 
more political power.210  Lastly, for a variety of other reasons, it appears to be 
easier to wield influence to block new initiatives than to enact new ones over 
opposition from other groups.211 
It is possible, though, that there could be an interest group comprised of 
individuals who want more experimentation generally.  The benefits of 
experiments are public goods, which would usually imply that voters who 
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favor it would free ride, rather than lobby.212  As we explained in Part II.B, 
however, there may be occasions where voters with a strong preference for 
risky legislation will form a small block within a larger polity.  In those cases, 
it may be that there will be a group of risk seekers who lobby for more 
innovative government, on the theory that they have few others on whose 
efforts they could usefully free ride.  That story is especially plausible if these 
risk seekers have more to gain from successful experiments than most other 
voters, because again that would reduce the usefulness of a free-riding strategy.  
At the same time, it is possible there would also be coalitions of unusually risk-
averse actors, who would work to counter the labors of the risk seekers.  If, as 
we suggested, there is a political bias in favor of the status quo, the risk-averse 
will often win these battles. 
One way in which interest groups clearly can boost innovation is by their 
opposition to reform in neighboring jurisdictions.  Some innovations, such as 
new forms of redistributive taxation, will predictably draw fire from small, 
concentrated groups.213  This creates a situation in which a jurisdiction 
contemplating the new, controversial policy is a sort of ideological outlier: it 
knows that its neighbors are highly unlikely to embark on the policy, so its 
voters should have no reason to prefer free-riding.  The irony here is that the 
factors that make the policy unlikely to succeed will often bear in all 
jurisdictions.  Opposition groups, knowing that adoption in one state makes 
adoption in neighboring states more likely,214 may lobby everywhere in order 
to prevent domino effects.215 
Overall, public choice theory does little to change the base assessment that 
officials are risk averse.  Where experiments do happen, public choice theory 
suggests that they may often be welfare-reducing. 
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It should be said that the factors we identify both here and in the previous 
section are not necessarily unique to state and local government.  Risk-averse 
elected officials may be as endemic in a centralized system as in one that is 
decentralized.216  We largely reserve analysis of centralized performance for 
the sequel to this Article.  For now, we will simply say that one role of central 
government may be to cure the absence of incentives to innovate found in local 
politicians; it isn’t easy (although, as we hope to show, not impossible) for a 
single government to offer itself the same cures.  At the same time, it is 
possible that there are features of decentralized government that may offset the 
disincentives to innovate that we have sketched so far.  We turn there now. 
C. Extra-Jurisdictional Effects 
The possibility that public officials are imperfect agents of their voting 
constituents is not necessarily bad news for overall national welfare.  Self-
interested officials may have reasons to please not only their own constituents, 
but also outsiders.  If that is the case, it may be that officials will internalize 
any spillovers generated by their policies, even if local voters would not.  In 
this section we consider three such internalization stories: fundraising, 
ambitions for higher office, and policy evangelism. 
1. Fundraising 
Where the act of voting itself is only a small part of the electoral process, 
outsiders (i.e., non-voters) have significant opportunities for influencing 
elections.  As many commentators have pointed out, policies that please out-
of-state constituencies can bring in campaign dollars or other political rents, 
leading local politicians to take account of the extra-jurisdictional effects of 
their policies.217  Although this story is rather more difficult to tell for 
unelected bureaucrats, the unelected official is still subject to many carrots and 
sticks offered by the elected officials who directly benefit from outside 
contributions.  Moreover, outsiders can offer agency officials allies in their 
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efforts to obtain more resources and policy authority from their political 
superiors.218 
It is unlikely, though, that there would be much in the way of rents from 
outsiders in support of a policy of innovation generally.  Outside contributors, 
just like local voters, perceive innovation as a public good, for whose provision 
they should prefer to free ride on the efforts of others.  That is, innovation in 
general benefits the entire nation so that there are no constituents, either inside 
the jurisdiction or out, who have any incentive to lobby for it.  Even if there 
were a group of, say, particularly risk-seeking citizens scattered across the 
country, transaction costs would likely inhibit their efforts to encourage 
innovation.219  The group would have to identify one another and coalesce, and 
would constantly have to battle incentives among its own members to free ride 
on one another’s contributions.  It would also be prohibitively difficult for such 
a group to monitor the behavior of every local jurisdiction, although regional 
innovation coalitions are more plausible.220 
Free-rider effects can also be countered with targeted incentives.  For 
instance, the United States offers tax exemption and other benefits for 
nonprofit organizations, business leagues, and the like, which can help to 
overcome the problems of pro-innovation group formation.221  While many of 
these organizations cannot intervene in campaigns for public office, most are 
permitted a fair amount of non-electoral lobbying activity, which could 
presumably be used to support efforts to enact innovative policies.222  So, 
depending on the effectiveness of these incentives, it is possible that local 
officials may have some self-serving incentives to innovate, as a way of 
garnering at least indirect support from outside organizations.  In a sense, 
though, this story cuts against the pure case for state and local innovation, 
because the implication is that absent some targeted fiscal transfer from a 
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central authority, incentives for innovation will not arise spontaneously on 
their own. 
Outside contributions in support of innovative candidates can arise without 
central incentives in cases where the innovative policy appeals to a particular 
interest group.223  For example, if the innovation is tied to an existing spillover 
affecting a discrete set of outsiders, such that the outsiders have little 
expectation that they can free ride, they will likely be closely involved in the 
policy.  Oyster harvesters in Florida, dependent on groundwater flowing from 
Georgia, are highly attuned to Georgia’s efforts at water conservation.224  
Alternatively, a given innovation could garner outside rewards if it falls in an 
area of interest to a group of what we call policy evangelists—people who 
derive personal utility from seeing their beliefs adopted widely.  The American 
Cancer Society, for example, supports candidates willing to prohibit indoor 
smoking in public places.225 
Once again, though, interest groups may arise on both sides of an issue.  
Innovations could anger outside groups enough to lead them to contribute to an 
official’s political opponents.  Still, there may be an instance where 
contributions by irate outsiders will be low but outside support high, as where 
those who oppose a policy are spread widely throughout the country.226  Taken 
together, these factors lend some modest support for a second-best 
internalization story.  Where admirers of an innovator do not free ride, but 
opponents do, the official may realize some of the extra-jurisdictional benefits 
of her experiment. 
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2. Ambitions for Higher Office 
As RA noted, the desire to earn a reputation as an innovator might spur 
local officials to experiment.227  More recently, others, such as Hills, 
Kotsogiannis, and Schwager, have extended that argument.228  A safe 
incumbent may value a risky experiment, not because it improves her odds of 
immediate reelection, but rather because it offers her an opportunity to appeal 
to future voters, some of whom may reside outside her current jurisdiction.229  
A governor might lay the groundwork for a presidential or cabinet bid by 
demonstrating that she is an innovator, or at least that she has the savvy to pick 
good projects from bad—what Kotsogiannis and Schwager call a signal of 
“high ability.”230  There are two separate stories here.  One strand is the 
signaling effect of successful innovation: Assuming voters have imperfect 
information about the candidates for office, innovating is a tool for a candidate 
to differentiate herself from future opponents.  The second thread is an 
internalization story: The candidate supports experimentation because 
innovation benefits the whole nation, including possible future constituents.231 
The internalization half of the story is implausible, largely for reasons we 
have already set out.  Individual voters do not value innovation per se at nearly 
its worth to society as a whole, because it is a public good.  Innovation might 
break ties between two otherwise identical candidates.  But, because each voter 
assigns little value to a politician’s willingness to experiment, she is highly 
unlikely to select a candidate whom she otherwise would not have chosen 
solely on the grounds of the candidate’s innovations.  Put another way, the 
voter will not trade her most preferred policies and candidate qualities for one 
that she ranks very low on her list of priorities.  Further, even if some voters 
were willing to value innovation highly, we again must take into account 
discounts for time and uncertainty.  It is unlikely that a candidate will be 
willing to risk losing a current election for dubious benefits in some future 
race.
232
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The reputation-as-signal-of-quality hypothesis is more persuasive, but it 
rests on several large assumptions.  First, the signaling theory assumes that 
innovating is a better tool for signaling quality than successful copying.  Recall 
that for the set of innovations we care about, innovation is riskier and costlier 
than copying.233  The payoffs from innovation must exceed copying payoffs by 
enough to offset these negatives.234  Experiments that miss this threshold are 
actually signals of poor judgment. 
Next, we doubt that there is any political premium for innovation over and 
above the rewards for enacting a successful policy that could be obtained by 
copying.  Both innovating and copying can be employed in federal office to 
increase constituent welfare.  As we just argued, it is unlikely voters will 
prioritize the ability to innovate over achievement of their other preferences.  
Moreover, if a reputation for being a judicious experimenter were more 
valuable than being known as someone who enacted good policies, we should 
expect that a candidate could also succeed politically by choosing experiments 
with positive ex ante expected value that happen to fail—taking good bets.  
However, there is no evidence that voters reward politicians who take wise but 
unsuccessful risks.235 
 
acquiring a good reputation is generally less valuable than holding onto a safe seat).  On the other hand, if the 
future office is highly desirable even accounting for time discounts, and the candidate views her odds of 
winning that office as remote, she should become highly risk-seeking in her efforts to win.  But cf. Rohde, 
supra note 229, at 5 (arguing that decision to run for new office is tradeoff between security and value of 
current seat and odds of success and value in new seat, and that secure incumbents should therefore rarely be 
interested in attempting improbable victories for new office). 
 
233
 While there may be some instances where copying is costlier than innovating, in those cases there is no 
positive externality from experimentation, so that low levels of innovation do not reduce social welfare. 
 
234
 Of course, copying would not be a viable strategy if every official were to conclude that innovation is 
not worthwhile.  But remember our claim is that local officials experiment at below socially optimal levels—
not that they fail to experiment at all.  For instance, incumbents in hotly contested races who do not have time 
to wait for someone else to invent must take on the task themselves.  Thus, there will generally be a pool of 
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 See Alesina & Cukierman, supra note 185, at 842 (observing that voters respond to policy outcomes); 
Howard Raiffa, Decision Making in the State-Owned Enterprise, in STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE 
WESTERN ECONOMIES 54, 55 (Raymond Vernon & Yair Aharoni eds., 1981) (observing that managers in state-
owned enterprises are judged by the outcome of their decisions rather than the soundness of their decision 
making); Strumpf, supra note 19, at 229–30 (noting policymakers’ “strong aversion to negative outcomes,” not 
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of implemented projects”); cf. Abramowicz, supra note 37, at 154 (noting that managers may often be 
punished for ex ante valuable but failed innovations).  To the contrary, many political scientists assume that 
the bulk of voters act by “retrospective voting”—that is, rather than spending the time and resources to gather 
in-depth information about whether policies were ex ante wise, voters simply reward or punish politicians ex 
post for good or bad outcomes.  See generally R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, INFORMATION AND ELECTIONS (1998); 
MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981). 
GALLE&LEAHY GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:18:03 PM 
1384 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58 
The key problem for politicians who might seek credit for these wise 
failures is voters’ lack of information.  It is rare that there is any objective 
source of information about the ex ante expected risks and payoffs of a given 
policy.236  If a politician is taking risks that her constituents would rather avoid 
(because they prefer to free ride), she cannot easily disclose that fact in 
advance.  And any claims she or her allies make ex post are not credible.  
Thus, voters cannot easily discern when a candidate has taken “good” risks.  
Even when good data are available, individuals often perceive the same set of 
risks and rewards differently, so that it is uncertain that there would be a 
uniform positive signal from taking any particular risk.   
More problematic is that in the base case secure incumbents do not take 
large risks.  If a politician takes risks, she may be signaling to voters that she 
has reason to think she will not be reelected—perhaps on the basis of 
information the voters themselves do not yet know.  In this case, taking even 
“good” policy risks could be a signal of low quality. 
What is more, apart from whether information about policy innovations 
flows freely to policymakers in various jurisdictions, it may be that 
information about who developed the innovations may not flow as freely to the 
voting public in other jurisdictions.  This is particularly true if it is easy to 
mimic successful innovation.237  A less able policymaker may adopt policies 
that are similar to prior innovations, but with enough cosmetic changes that the 
second policymaker can take credit for innovating on her own.  In a world with 
many mimics, it becomes easier for rivals to diminish the accomplishments of 
true innovators by accusing them of being mimics.  Hence, state policymakers 
who steal innovations may be viewed as successful “innovators” by their 
adoring public just as much as those policymakers who actually innovate.238  If 
innovating is costlier or riskier, it will often be wiser to mimic. 
While there has been no direct empirical investigation of the higher-office 
thesis, available data on the behavior of officials subject to term limits 
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 See Suurmond et al., supra note 235, at 2819, 2830. 
 
237
 Cf. id. at 2832 (predicting that low-quality officials will mimic reputation-building behavior of high-
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238
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enough to discern quality of political choices).  Similarly, when voters cannot identify good innovation at the 
time of their vote, acting differently from other legislators—that is, innovating—may be a signal of poor 
judgment by the legislator.  See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 466 (1990) (noting that “a manager who takes a contrarian position is perceived as more 
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GALLE&LEAHY GALLEYFINAL 6/2/2009  12:18:03 PM 
2009] LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY? 1385 
undercut the theory.  Besley and Case, summarizing their own work as well as 
several studies by others, find that “a variety of policy measures are affected 
by term limits.”239  For example, they report that, on average, state spending 
rises during the final term of a term-limited governor.240  The intuition here is 
that officials no longer subject to electoral constraints will spend in furtherance 
of their own policy aims (or the aims of those who will provide rents after the 
governor leaves office), without regard to voter preferences for lower taxes or 
debt.241  That account is hard to reconcile with the claim that officials who are 
seeking a new office will be attuned to the interests of the electorate for that 
position.  Unless voter preferences in the two electorates are radically different, 
ambitions for higher office should make term-limited officials behave as 
though they were not limited.  But that is not the case.242 
Assuming that there nonetheless are some officials with a propensity to 
take risk in an effort to win reputational rewards, this incentive may lead them 
all to race for the highest value innovation, rather than true experimentation.  
Recall that one aspect of the positive spillover benefit that experiments 
produce is that they generate information about alternatives.243  The highest-
expected-value-innovation may still fail, or produce less positive results than 
the second- or third-ranked policy might have yielded.  In short, if what we 
have is a race, not a set of experiments, then society loses out on the 
opportunity to observe these alternative experiments.  In this sort of race, then, 
there is little comparative advantage of decentralization over centralization; 
either way, we’re running only one experiment at a time. 
Reputational concerns seem likely to produce this sort of race-to-the-first-
best.  Where officials need to succeed in order to realize their reputational 
gains, we should expect officials all to strive for the highest-expected-value 
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240
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innovation, rather than diversifying their efforts in a way that would maximize 
social welfare.  Alternatively, if there were good information about ex ante 
probabilities, and voters rewarded good bets for their own sake, the electorate 
would still be highly unlikely to reward candidates for choosing the second- or 
third-best of their available options.  Choosing the second-best option would 
greatly muddy the signal of the candidate’s quality, particularly in a world with 
mimics who each could offer the “I wasn’t making a bad choice, I was 
generating an information spillover” excuse. 
Thus, notwithstanding the suggestions by some that RA’s failure to account 
carefully for ambitions for higher office completely undermines her thesis, it 
appears that ambition plays little role in generating fruitful local 
experimentation. 
3. Policy Evangelism 
Officials may also internalize the benefits of new policy for outsiders 
because the officials are motivated by a desire to see that policy spread, 
whether out of love for humanity, ideology, social status, or simple hubris.244  
Self-image is an important driver of individual behavior.245  However, it is a 
familiar point that, to the extent that these goals can best be fulfilled by 
remaining in office, the official is obliged to balance personal satisfaction with 
electoral success.246  Thus, we think that for the most part policy evangelism, 
in whatever form, will offer only weak incentives to officials to embark on 
riskier policies than their electorate would prefer.  Still, this story might be 
persuasive for the very safest of incumbents. 
Bureaucrats, like the safest incumbents, are insulated from electoral 
jeopardy, and so may be more sensitive to personal motives.  As we have 
noted, bureaucrats may derive increased social status among their peers from 
achieving expertise in new policy areas—they are invited to appear on panels 
at industry conferences, and to opine in trade journals and technical assistance 
training calls.247  Indirect electoral constraints, as we have also noted, will limit 
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bureaucratic capacity to innovate against the will of political leadership.248  
And many policies likely need legislative or chief executive leadership to 
succeed.  But the bureaucratic innovation theory is a more compelling one than 
the politician account. 
One limit that most bureaucrats face that does not confront legislators is 
process-based judicial review.  Most states mirror the federal system in 
allowing affected private parties (and, in some cases, even those who are not 
directly affected) to challenge administrative decisions on procedural 
grounds.249  In order to survive these challenges, the agency must show that its 
deliberations were open to the public, that it carefully considered the available 
policy alternatives, and that the choice it made was grounded in fact and 
reasonable conclusions from the known facts.250  Even policies that pass all 
these hurdles can be struck down by courts if found to be unreasonable 
applications of the underlying statutory authority.251 
Judicial review has the potential somewhat to stifle innovation.  Some 
scholars have worried that intensive process review “ossifies” agencies, 
binding them hopelessly in red tape.252  The claim that review will completely 
paralyze agencies has proven to be somewhat overblown, but in a world of 
limited resources an agency that must carefully research and justify all its 
decisions obviously will move slower and accomplish less than one that need 
not.253  Novel policies are likely more resource intensive, as they require more 
research and groundwork, and require the agency to answer more questions.254  
Further, policies that break dramatically from past practices are difficult for 
agencies to justify to courts, because the agency cannot easily point to a track 
record of success with similar efforts to allay court concerns.255  That implies 
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that the agency will likely want to pile up additional data before it faces 
judgment.256 
On the other hand, agencies seem to have adapted to the world of 
heightened judicial review in ways that may increase their capacity for 
innovation.  One consequence of the need to justify policy decisions with 
technical information is that agencies now have hired a variety of experts, such 
as scientists, statisticians, and the like.257  Many of these experts bring with 
them a network of connections with outside peers.258  As part of the 
rulemaking process, agency staff are also contacted by, or reach out to, private 
and academic researchers.259  There is strong evidence that these kinds of 
informal ties are important sources of both policy diffusion and innovation.260  
Agency experts learn the seeds of ideas from their contacts, seeds which they 
can graft together and cultivate. 
As a result, although electoral politics constrains much of the personal 
motivation that might otherwise inspire individual officials to attempt new 
policy, there can be significant innovation within the space left by “slack” for 
local agency personnel.  While not all policies can fruitfully germinate within 
an agency, at least some might.  It is unclear, though, whether there is any 
personal motivation for bureaucrats to coordinate their experiments across 
jurisdictions, or whether again we will simply see a race to the highest-
expected-value innovation.  And bureaucrats in various jurisdictions may be 
less likely than elected officials to have differing opinions about the “best” of 
the innovation options, because the bureaucrats tend to share more information 
with one another, rely on similar sources of authority, and take a less 
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ideological attitude toward policymaking.261  Thus, their race to the top will be 
a race to the same summit. 
D. Challengers, Not Incumbents? 
Thus far we have analyzed the incentives of officials who already hold 
office.  Incumbents tend to be averse to risk because they are typically safely 
guaranteed a return to office without any risk-taking.  This implies that, 
reciprocally, challengers should be risk-seeking.262  Is it possible that 
challengers could be a source of innovative policy? 
First, it is unlikely that challengers themselves will implement innovation.  
For one thing, challengers usually lose.263  Additionally, once a challenger 
succeeds in winning a seat in office, she becomes an incumbent, with an eye 
on the next election.  She no longer is highly motivated to take large risks.  To 
be sure, there may be some pressure on the new incumbent to implement her 
grand campaign promises.  Social science suggests, though, that the penalties 
for failing to implement all of a candidate’s policy proposals are relatively 
small.264  Memories are short, voters are rationally ignorant, and even attentive 
interest groups seem to understand that few politicians have the power single-
handedly to implement their full agenda.265 
In any event, the challenger-innovation hypothesis assumes that there are 
electoral rewards for suggesting innovations without demonstrating good 
results.  We have argued that that premise is an unlikely one.  It may be true 
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that voters will want candidates to have a “plan” for dealing with important 
challenges.  There is no obvious reason, though, why this plan must strike the 
public as innovative.  Again, innovative but untested proposals are likely to 
harm, not help, most candidates.266 
This analysis also largely forecloses another possibility, which is that 
incumbents might be driven to innovate in response to agenda-setting by 
challengers.  If risk-seeking incumbents can set the terms of debate for an 
election, this argument would go, then perhaps incumbents must be reactive 
rather than strategic in choosing what policy to implement.  This produces 
innovation by incumbents, however, only to the extent that challengers succeed 
in placing on the political agenda issues or social problems that the incumbent 
cannot address by borrowing—or by borrowing, tweaking, and claiming to 
innovate.  Again, because these are lower cost and lower risk techniques than 
true innovation, an incumbent should prefer them.  Unless voters demand real 
innovation, and have the capacity to discern it from tweaked borrowing—both 
possibilities we have argued are implausible—there is no reason that 
challengers will drive incumbents to implement risky new policies.267 
E. Other Psychological Factors 
To this point we have largely assumed that politicians are rational 
maximizers: they behave in conformance with whatever will maximize their 
subjective welfare, including preferences for serving others.  It is now well-
documented that humans do not consistently behave in this way.  We make 
mistakes, we doubt ourselves, and we procrastinate or are otherwise mentally 
lazy.268  Several of these factors might tend to diminish the extent to which 
policymakers, if subject to them, would innovate.  It is, however, an open 
question whether in competitive political markets these kinds of behaviors 
persist or if instead they are competed away. 
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We can begin with what is probably the best-known cognitive effect in the 
legal literature, the endowment effect.269  Generally speaking, individuals 
attach higher value to rights or property they already hold than to those they do 
not, even where the two are considered equivalent by neutral third parties.270  
Obviously, if officials experience the endowment effect when considering 
whether to implement new policies, they will be less likely to take worthwhile 
gambles, as they will not value the upside from risk highly enough.271  And if 
voters must judge politicians on the wisdom of the risks they take before being 
able to observe the outcomes, voters subject to endowment effects will give too 
little credit to politicians who took positive expected-value gambles.  
Relatedly, individuals prefer to avoid losses more than they favor equivalent 
gains, which should again result in a bias in favor of the status quo.272 
Similarly, individuals tend to be averse to uncertainty.273  Again, if this 
phenomenon is prevalent among policymakers, or relevant to the decisions of 
voters who judge them, we should expect less innovation, which by definition 
entails uncertainty. 
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Additionally, people may have so-called “time-inconsistent preferences.”274  
That is, we may prefer to do something now that is inconsistent with what we 
would prefer to have happened later.275  The grasshopper sleeps away the 
summer instead of storing food, even though he may know that he will wish he 
hadn’t.  More technically, the present self perceives the disutility of small but 
immediate costs as larger than the present-discounted value of undergoing the 
costs, even when the individual would later reach a different conclusion.276  
Innovation requires higher costs now—researching alternatives, deciding 
between them, persuading the public to accept risks, overcoming political 
pushback from those who are averse to the risk—in exchange for putative 
gains later.  In effect, officials with a tendency toward avoiding immediate 
costs will have a highly exaggerated discount rate for the promised future 
gains, making them disinclined to take on the current costs. 
Scholars are only now beginning to debate whether these kinds of cognitive 
failures can arise or persist among policymakers facing a competitive political 
market.277  In conventional market theory, underperforming actors will be 
pushed out by those who are better aware of reality, or at least those who are 
aware of their own failings and compensate for them—for example, by hiring 
good advisors.278  If a politician passes up good bets because of her bias toward 
the status quo, a rival will come along and outperform her.279  While there may 
be no opportunities for direct challengers to outperform an incumbent, voters 
can observe the performance of neighboring officials and use their skill as a 
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yardstick for their own government.280  This assumes, though, that neighboring 
officials are not also biased.  Whether “yardstick competition” of this kind is 
an effective source of market discipline depends on the spatial and other 
characteristics of the rival jurisdictions.281  That is, it may be hard for voters to 
judge their own politicians by the performance of others in distant, very 
different states.  If there are only a few nearby similar states for voters to look 
to, it is possible that officials in all of them could equally underperform. 
Another source of political market correctives is the housing market.  
Home values reflect in part the value generated by local government.282  If 
values are distorted by cognitive biases, “smart” market actors have 
opportunities for arbitrage—buying at bargain prices from the foolish and 
selling to the other smarties.283  Other market actors can see these signals and 
adjust their own prices accordingly.  Thus, it usually takes only a few “smart” 
actors to correct a market, at least where the products in the market are all 
fairly similar.284  In the case of homes, though, it is difficult to tell this story, at 
least for overpriced housing.  Suppose a homeowner recognizes that her 
government is underperforming, and wants to find some way to profit off that 
recognition.  If her home were a security, she could just short it—place a bet 
that it would decline in value.285  If enough investors short a given security, 
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prices will tend to decline, as the market absorbs the negative signal.286  But 
there are few obvious ways to place a bet that one’s own home will decline in 
value.287  Thus, we doubt that the private housing market can currently be an 
important source of negative information about biased government.288 
In any event, as we have said, this a field where work is just beginning.  At 
present, though, there seems a fair chance that the psychology of public 
officials and voters may impede innovation. 
F. Role of Political Parties 
Another highly undeveloped field is the influence of political parties on 
policy innovation.  There is, of course, a vast literature on the purposes, 
behavior, and governance of parties.  To date, though, there has been no real 
effort to connect these analyses to the innovation question.  Our own tentative 
view is that parties will tend to moderate the degree to which individual 
candidates deviate from the preferences of their constituents, whether toward 
or away from greater risk. 
On one leading account of the function of parties, voters lack complete 
information about candidates, and rely on the endorsement of the party as an 
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indication of the candidate’s quality and expected policy views.289  Individual 
actors can harm the party by performing poorly or otherwise enacting 
unpopular policies, which reduces the value of the party’s endorsement for all 
other party members.290  Thus, the party members have incentives to select 
favorable candidates, and to use whatever influence they have to promote 
policies that increase their collective reputation.291  There is something of a 
danger of party members free-riding on one another’s efforts at monitoring 
each other, but the members can hire agents to monitor themselves, and write 
contracts to incentivize the monitors adequately.292 
In another account, political parties exist in order to prevent politicians 
from adopting extreme policies.  As Gilat Levy explains, where there are large 
rents from holding office and exercising wide policy autonomy, individual 
candidates cannot credibly commit to keep their campaign promises.293  That 
is, Levy posits a situation where rewards from breaking a promise are 
potentially large enough that candidates will be willing to give up future 
reputation to earn them.  Because voters do not know the individual 
candidate’s utility function, they do not know whether they are likely to face 
this situation.  The party, on the other hand, is a repeat player with many 
investors who contribute shared effort in exchange for collective benefits.  
Thus, the party can credibly commit to sanctions against members who act 
contrary to the party’s own interest, which is plausibly tied closely to voter 
preferences.  So membership in a party is a promise not to enact policies far 
enough from median preferences that they would hurt the party.294 
Thus, under either view the general effect of parties should be to constrain 
individual officials from undertaking behavior that will displease the 
electorate.  Parties should dampen any preference individual officials may have 
to take on more risk than their constituents prefer.  At the same time, parties 
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ought to discipline slacking officials who innovate at far below public 
expectations. 
The importance of these party influences depends on whether parties are 
able to create high-powered incentives for individual officials in office.295  We 
do not have space here to canvass these in depth.  Briefly, many of the benefits 
the party has to offer pertain to election and reelection: favorable branding, the 
promise of moderation, fundraising, volunteers, and the like.296  An incumbent 
who is confident she will win, or who is uninterested in reelection, will be as 
indifferent to these influences as she is to the electorate generally.  Parties can 
also deliver other kinds of spoils, though, such as post-retirement rewards, 
appointment to administrative positions, and support from other branches or 
tiers of government for contested policy.297  There is some data to suggest that 
parties are a more important influence on governors when a governor’s own 
party also holds the legislature, suggesting that at least some of these forms of 
policy assistance are significant.298 
Complicating all of this analysis is the fact that parties are typically 
national in scope.  Different policies may have varying reputational effects for 
the party in different regions.  Parties may encourage policy that looks very 
risky to some constituencies but safe to its own leadership, or vice versa.  How 
these choices play out will likely depend on the political landscape, the party’s 
internal governance structure, and similar factors.  For instance, parties might 
allow candidates in jurisdictions relatively hostile to the party’s national 
platform to deviate fairly far from the party’s preferences, in order to maximize 
the odds of winning.299  Conceivably, this could include permitting local 
candidates to take risks, or to avoid innovation, more than most candidates 
offered by the party. 
It might be argued that, inasmuch as the parties are an agglomeration of 
national interests, they should encourage candidates to internalize spillovers 
from innovation.  For example, the Republican Party might coordinate 
experiments by Republican governors, in an effort to develop winning policy 
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positions it could use nationwide.300  This may be true for policies with clearly 
conservative valence, such as major restrictions on abortion rights.301  But for 
policies that might plausibly be emulated by Democrats, the party, like an 
individual state, should prefer to free ride.  Parties may also be risk averse 
because of the potentially large reputational harm of failed policies.302  Think 
of Michael Dukakis’s experiences with Massachusetts Bay, or national 
pushback against local gay-marriage ordinances. 
As we said, given the paucity of prior work in this area, it is difficult to be 
confident about any predictions about the effects of parties.  However, a 
tentative analysis suggests that they are unlikely to be effective in encouraging 
innovation.  To the extent that innovation depends on individual officials’ 
willingness to defy local preferences for free-riding, parties may actually 
dampen it. 
G. Summary 
As we have emphasized from the outset, generalizations about innovation 
are hazardous.  However, based on our analysis in this Part, it would seem that 
imperfect agency by public officials, if anything, will tend to diminish state 
and local innovation.  Rational public actors have incentives to avoid risk, 
whether motivated directly by electoral success or indirectly by money or 
rents.  Irrational behavior could potentially compound these tendencies.  The 
standard reputation-building story spun by RA’s doubters, we have shown, has 
numerous holes.  For reputation to increase a candidate’s willingness to 
experiment, the candidate would have to value the future increased odds of 
success in higher office above the present increased risk of loss.  Considering 
that it is unclear whether voters can distinguish good experiments from bad, or 
from copies, that seems like a poor wager.  Even if an individual candidate 
perceived reputational benefits from ignoring her current constituency’s 
preferences, the candidate’s party may see things differently, and exercise its 
influence to rein her in. 
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CONCLUSION 
At this point, there is a strong theoretical argument—backed by some 
empirical findings—that, absent outside intervention, state and local 
governments will on the whole innovate at well below the socially optimal 
level.  Optimal innovation demands rather extreme conditions: unique state 
policy needs, utterly opaque information, or first-mover premia that greatly 
exceed the expected cost of experimenting.  Absent these circumstances, states 
will still invent, but to a degree that diminishes overall social welfare.303  And 
these conditions may be fleeting.  For instance, “leader” states may have 
reasons to act first, but, having won their first race, may be inclined to coast 
afterwards.304 
Critics of RA have typically accepted this reality, but focused instead on 
the incentives of individual politicians to innovate in excess of their own 
constituents’ preferences.  But politicians are structurally risk averse, a 
tendency that is only exacerbated by the status-quo biases of large contributors 
and officials’ own psychology.  We have shown that the only story that has 
been offered to justify risk-seeking—the urge to garner a reputation as an 
innovator—is extremely implausible.  Given that only insecure incumbents 
should take risks, innovation could well signal low ability, not high aptitude.  
And, even if innovating were a positive signal, it is a very noisy one, easily 
copied and hard to measure except ex post. 
Defenders of the innovation theory of federalism have also pointed out that, 
even if each state tends to avoid experiments, the sheer fact that state and local 
governments greatly outnumber the federal government, and have different 
views about policy, will produce many different policies.305  But the claim that 
innovation increases with the number of jurisdictions, too, is at best 
ambiguous.  It is true that the likelihood of differing views rises as the number 
of actors increases.  But so, too, does the number of ways in which the pie of 
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innovation gains must be sliced.306  Free-riding also increases with the number 
of jurisdictions, as the more states there are, the more likely it is that there will 
be another jurisdiction upon which any given state can free ride at a cost-
effective rate.  Which effects predominate for any particular policy is 
theoretically indeterminate.  Further, as we have noted, experimentation and 
the concept of a “laboratory” is about more than multiple policies and random 
innovations: it is also about coordinating innovations to reduce waste and 
ensure that what appear ex ante to be low-value wagers sometimes are taken.  
Large numbers of jurisdictions may help to diversify wagers but increase 
waste.  Again, theory does not tell us in which direction social welfare is 
increased. 
Finally, neither of these sets of responses truly vindicates the claim that 
states can be “laboratories” of democracy.  Experimentation implies efforts to 
pool information, diversify risks, and learn from both successes and failures.  
Only in that way do efforts at policy innovation maximize society’s return on 
the investment in new lawmaking.  We found no plausible account to suggest 
that states on their own would engage in that behavior. 
What, then, are the implications of our findings for the federalism debate?  
Even if innovation were the only justification for federalism, it still would not 
necessarily follow from our analysis that all policy should be made by a 
centralized, national government.  At most, we have shown that policy 
innovation is reason to situate some policies in the national government.307  To 
be sure, it is difficult to say for certain when decentralized experiments will 
lag.  We have shown that whether a state will experiment depends on many 
factors, which will vary based on the policy, the state, the state’s citizens’ 
preferences, and the preferences, electoral security, and party membership of 
the state’s officials.  Still, it should be straightforward to identify some policy 
areas as having very strong potential for suboptimal innovation.  Policies that 
will be easy for other jurisdictions to notice, difficult to conceal, cheap to copy 
relative to their benefits, and that would be of similar value in most of the 
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country are likely to see significant free-riding, and so are good candidates for 
nationalization.308 
Another crucial reason that our results here do not necessarily imply the 
superiority of centralized government is because we have told only half the 
story.  We have demonstrated the likelihood that, absent intervention, states 
will fall short of being ideal planners.  But so, too, may Congress and the 
President.  The question whether there are other institutions that states might 
employ to overcome some of their own shortcomings is also still open.  For 
instance, states might contract with private firms, whether for-profit or 
nonprofit, to perform innovative services.  If firms retain property rights in 
their innovations, they should have stronger incentives to experiment—
although, as monopolists, they may price the right to use their inventions at a 
level that reduces social welfare.  Finally, there may be various hybrid 
institutions that, in combination, can account for the shortcomings of any one 
approach alone.  All of these topics we must leave for our sequel article to this 
one; stay tuned. 
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